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SUPREME

COURT

DUFF, AS PIONEER STOCK
POWDER CO. vs. KOONTZ.
No. 5.
Agency -

Disputed Authority -

Blank

Forms--Written Addition by Agent-Ratification in Part--Action by PrincipalFailure of Consideration -

Evidence -

Al-

leged Unauthorized Part of Contract Admitted-Letter of Third Person to Principal
Admitted.
1. Where an agent, using the form
blanks provided by the principal, takes the
third person's written order for goods and
his promissory note in payment therefor,
and as part of the same transaction agrees
to map out territory for the sale of such
goods and signs and delivers a written
agreement "to come and ride, advertise for
and with (said third person) to help sell
and make him safe in (said) bill of goods,"
the principal cannot ratify the written order
and note alone and recover thereon; he must
ratify the entire contract or not at all. To
repudiate part constitutes failure of consideration for which the third person may
rescind the contract, return the goods and
bar the principal's recovery on the note and
order.
2. A note as follows: "No contract or
agreement other than what appears on the
face of this order shall bind the Pioneer
Stock Powder Co.", printed on the order
blank below the line for the purchaser's
signature, does not constitute notice as a
matter of law, but is merely relevant evidence tending to establish actual notice to
the purchaser of the limitation of the
ageni's authority.
3. If the agency or the scope of authority is in dispute, it is not error to admit
evidence of the alleged agent's acts under
instruction of the court that the principal
is not bound by such acts unless the jury
find that agency exists or that the acts
were authorized by the principal, as he
case may be.
4. Where payment and failure of consideration are plead it is not error to admit
in evidence a letter of the third person to
the principal which refers to the enclosures
of check in payment of part of the goods
received and bill of lading for the return
shipment of the balance of such goods and
which also states as reason for so doing
the admitted facts that the principal did not
map out territory and send agent to work
therein as agreed.
5. The function of appellate courts is to
determine errors of law occurring on the
trial and not to consider anew the issues of
fact. Verdicts will not be disturbed on the
mere weight or conflict of the evidence.
Only where there is a total lack of evidence
to support some material element in the
case will a new trial be granted on appeal.

Action in assumpsit by Chas. E.
Duff, doing business in the name and
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style of the Pioneer Stock Powder
Company, against Samuel Koontz.
From a judgment for the defendant
plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
Leo J. Hassenauer and Francis J.
Walsh for appellant.
Clifford O'Sullivan and William J.
McGrath for appellee.
VURPULLAT, J. This action was
begun'by the filing of a praecipe in
the Notre Dame Circuit Court declaring in the action of special assumpsit. After declaration and affidavit of merit were filed the plaintiff
filed amended declaration in two
counts. The facts plead and proven
by way of inducement disclose that
Charles E. Duff, by purchase, assignment and delivery, became the sole
owner of all the notes, contracts,
claims, stock and business of The
Pioneer Stock Powder Company of
Bloomington, Illinois; that he continued to conduct the business in the
name and style of said company; and
that in that capacity he brought this
action.
The first count of amended declaration is founded on the following
promisory note, to-wit:
$165.00
Walkerton, State of Indiana.
May 10, 1918.
On the 2nd day of September,
1918, we, or either of us, promise to
pay to the order of the Pioneer Stock
Powder Company, One Hundred and
Sixty-five Dollars, value received,
without discount, waiving all our
right to all exemptions allowed us by
law, with interest at 7 per cent. from
maturity if not paid when due or
when presented.
Samuel Koontz.
(Signed)
County of St. Joseph.
Witness, F. E. Rohrer.
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The second count is founded on
the following written contract:
Walkerton, Indiana, May 10, 1918.
Pioneer Stock Powder Company,
Bloomington, Illinois.
Pleast ship to Samuel Koontz,
2,000 pounds of Pioneer Stock powders at six cents per pound. Amount
$120.00. Fifty gallons Pioneer Dip
at $.90 per gallon. Amount $45.00.
On the second day of September
after date, for value received, I
agree to pay One Hundred and Sixtyfive dollars to the order of the Pioneer Stock Co., at Bloomington,
Purchaser.
Illinois.
(Signed)
Samuel Koontz,
F. E. Rohrer, Salesman.
The note and contract declared on
support but one and the same demand, the note having been given
pursuant to the contract. To this
amended declaration the defendant
filed plea in five counts supported by
affidavit of merit. The first count is
the general issue, the second and
fourth counts plead failure of consideration, the third count payment and
the fifth countpartpayment, and failure of consideration as to the remainder. The second count of plea is
upon the theory of failure of consideration upon facts specially plead.
We believe that the facts and issues
of the case can be best presented by
setting out in full this count which is
as follows:
"And for this second count of plea
to the first and second counts of declaration and to each separately and
severally, the defendant says that on
the 10th day of May, 1918, one, Rorest E. Rohrer, was acting as a traveling agent for the Pioneer Stock Powder Company and on said day had
full authority from said company to
execute contracts for and in behalf

of said company, and said Rohrer did
act in behalf and for and as agent of
said company at all of the times and
in all things hereinafter complained
of; and on said day sold to the defendant one ton of stock food and ten
jacket cans of fluid, the same being
a food product manufactured and
kept for sale by said company at
Bloomington, Illinois, to be shipped
t osaid defendant billed to Walkerton,
Indiana.
"That at the time of said sale, the
said Pioneer Stock Powder Company,
by its said agent, Rohrer, and the defendant, Koontz, entered into the following written contract, to-wit:
"Walkerton, May 10th. By this I
certify and agreed to come and ride,
advertise for, and with Mr. Samuel
Koontz to help sell and make him
safe in the Pioneer bill of Goods.
Forrest E. Rohrer.
$165.00. Walkerton, State of Indiana,
May 10th, 1918. On the second day
of September after date, we or either
of us, promise to pay to the order of
Pioneer Stock Powder Company, One
Hundred and Sixty-five Dollars. Value received, with discount or set off,
waiving our rights to all exemptions
allowed us by law, with interest at 7
per cent from maturity, if not paid
when due or when presented. Co. of
Starke.
Witness, F. E. Rohrer.
Samuel Koontz."
"And at the time of the negotiations and at the time said sale was
made, said agent stated to this defendant that the latter was purchasing
the right and would be allowed to
sell the stock food, both barrel and
can product in such territory as the
company would map out for said defendant which said agent stated
would be about up to Stilwell. And
after the execution of said written
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contract, said agent said to this de- shipment other than said barrel foi
fendant in substance do not sell in which he fully paid, from the time
ay territory until the company maps of its receipt by him, safely housed
it out for you and I will let you know and stored until the 17th day of July,
when I come to advertise and help 1918, when he re3hipped said product
you sell. And said defendant alleges billed to the said Pioneer Stock Powthat after being signed, such part of der Company at Bloomington, Illithe- contract by said Rohrer signed nois. And defendant says that he
was delivered to this defendant, and has kept and performed all the consuch part of the contract signed by ditions of such contract so far as he
Koontz was delivered to said Rohrer was permitted to do under the terms
thereof, and was prevented from
as agent for said company.
And defendant further- says that complying further by reason of the
within two weeks after the agree- acts of the plaintiff, Pioneer Stock
ment was made the ton of stock food Powder Sompany; but he says that
was shipped to said Koontz and with- said Pioneer Stock Powder Co. has
in a further ten days thereafter the wholly failed and refused to keep
fluid product was also shipped to him and perform the conditions imposed
and all reached him in less than a upon it by said agreement.
month after the sale; and defendant
And this the said defendant is
says that he at once cared for and ready to. verify.
housed said products and notified
Plaintiff's replication was a simisuch Pioneer Stock Powder Company liter to the first count and a tender
to come on and outline and lay out of the general issue to, the other
this defendant's territory and ride counts of plea which was accepted
and advertise and help sell 'the pro- by defendant.
A jury returned a
duct, but that said company neglect- general verdict for the defendant
ed and refused to allot defendant any together with answers to interrogaterritory and neglected to aid him in tories. The court overruled the moadvertising such product, and never tion for a new trial and rendered
did allot to defendant and territory judgment on the verdict from which
or help in any manner to advertise, plaintiff prosecutes this appeal.
sell or make defendant safe in the
The errors assigned for reversal
Pioneer bill of goods.
of the judgment are the overruling
That defedant, soon after the reof the motion for a new trial, and
ceipt of such product, used one barthat the verdict is contrary to the
rel, about 165 lbs., of the stock food
evidence and contrary to the law.
for his own animals as part of the
One of the causes in support of the
idvertising agreed upon; but he said
for a new trial is the alleged
motion
that at the time he so used the same
he believed that the said company error in admitting in evidence over
objection the following
would come on and allot him terri- appellant
defendant's Exhibit
being
writing,
to
tory and would aid him according
to-wit:
4,
No.
And the defendant
the contract.
"Walkerton, May 10th. By this I
further says that he has paid the said
and agree to come and ride,
certify
company the full value of the stock
for, and with Samuel
advertise
food so used. And the defendant
help sell and make him
to
Koontz
further alleges that he kept such
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safe in the Pioneer Bill of Goods.
Forrest E. Rohrer."
This offered evidence is part of the
contract set out in the second count
of the plea which appellee alleges is
the contract entered into between
himself and the appellant through
the negotiations of appellant's agent,
Forrest E. Rohrer. Appellant contends that his agent had no authority to enter into such a contract and
that it was therefore error to permit
the introduction of this evidence to
establish such contract.
Whether appellant's agent had or
had not this authority was one of
the important issues to be determined on the trial; and in this case the
issue was one of fact for the jury and
not one of law for the court. Where
the appointment and authority of an
agent are in writing, or the facts relating thereto are undisputed, it is a
question of law for the court alone
to decide whether agency exists and,
if so, the nature and scope thereof.
But where the authority is not in
writing and the facts are in dispute,
as in this case, it is for the jury to
determine, under proper instructions
of the court, both the existence of
the agency and the character and extent of the agent's authority. Loudon Savings ]Fund Society vs. Hagerstown Savings Bank, 36 Pa. St.
496-78 Am. Dec. 390-Mechem's Cases
on Agency 371; Rees vs. Medlock 27
Tax. 120-84 Am. Dec. 611; Gulick vs.
Grover 33 N. J. L. 463- 97 Am. Dec.
728; Seehorn vs. Hall 130 Mo. 25732 S.W. 643- 51 Am. St. Rep. 562; I
Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law (2nd Ed.)
967; Mecham on Agency Sec. 104.
Where the agency is in dispute, it is
not error to admit in evidence statements of the alleged agent under an
instruction of the court that, unless
the jury find the facts necessary to

establish the agency, the principal
will not be bound by such statements.
Wilcox vs. Hines, 100 Tenn. 524-45
S. W. 781-66 Am. St. Rep. 761.
Even if appellant's cantention be
conceded that his ageht did ot have
authority to enter into the contract
in question, or that he exceeded his
authority, yet the contract was properly admitted in evidence; for the
appellant is bound by such contract
if he ratified what his agent did in
his behalf without authority. Elliott
on Evidence Vol 3, Sec. 1639. The
familiar maxim of agency applies
"Omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur et
mendato priori aequiparatur." Such
adoptive authority," says Woodward,
J., in Loudon Savings Fund Bank vs.
Hagerstown Savings Bank, supra,
"relates back to the time of the original transaction, and is deemed, in
law, the same to all purposes as if it
Whether
had been given before."
the appellant did or did not ratify
such contract is also an issue which,
under the disputed facts, must be determined by the jury under the proper instructions of the court. Mecham
on Agency, Sec. 137; Taylor vs. Conner, 41 Miss. 722-97 Am. Dec. 419;
Paul vs. Berry 78 Ill. 157.
If the jury had found that appellant's agent had authority to negotiate the contract in question, or that
such contract entered into without
such authority, was ratified by appellant, then it would have been reversible error for the trial court to
have rejected the admitted evidence
tending to establish part of that contract. Stagg vs. Compton 81 Ind.
171; Stone vs. Sanborne 104 Mass.
201-6 Am. Rep. 238. There was no
error in admitting Defendant's Exhibit No. 4.
Nor was there error in the admission over appellant's object of de-
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fendant's Exhibit No. 5, which is
also complained of as ground for
new trial. This was a letter of defendant, properly enclosed in a sealed, stamped and addressed envelope
and sent by mail to appellant, calling
attention to the enclosure therewith
of defendant's check in payment of
part of the goods shipped to defendant under the contract, and also to a
bill of lading for the return shipment of the balance of such goods,
and stating as reasons for so doing
that appellant had failed to map out
territory and send its agent to work
with defendant, facts which appellant
admitted on the trial. This letter,
together with the enclosed check and
bill of lading which were also admitted in evidence, constituted direct,
legal, relevant evidence in support of
defendant's plea of payment and
failure of consideration, and, as such,
was clearly admissable in evidence.
Elliott on Evidence Vol. 1, Sec. 144;
Hughes on Evidence 35.
Is the verdict contrary to the evidence? It is a general rule of appellate procedure that the verdict of the
jury or finding of the trial court will
not be disturbed merely on the
weight and conflict of the evidence.
Every presumption is indulged in
support of the verdict and the trial
court's rulings. The theory is that
the trial court that heard the testimony of the witnesses and considered their credibility is more competent
to determine the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict when
passing on the motion for a new
trial, than is the court of appellate
jurisdiction which has only the transcript of the record of the trial as a
basis for its decision. Moreover, the
function of the appellate court is not
to decide issues of fact, but to determine alleged errors of law occur-

ring on the trial. With respect to
the evidence, the appellate court decides merely whether there is any
evidence in the record to sustain the
operative facts on which the verdict
must rest. See Article, New Trial,
Vol. 14, Pg. 768 Enc. of Pldg. & Pr.
Also Article on Appeals, Vol. 2, Pgs.
390-391Id., with citation of cases
from all jurisdictions. Railroad Co.
vs. Wyman 134 Ind. 681-33 N. E.
367.
However, since agency is so much
a question of law or a mixed question of law and fact, we shall consider the evidence in the light of the
law and determine whether there is
any evidence to support the verdict.
It is elementary in the law of
agency that an agent can bind his
pricipal only to the extent of the authority actually conferred on him by
the principal; and that the agent, in
the exercise of his authority, may
use only such means as are necessary,
proper and usual in accomplishing
the purpose for which the agency
was created. 2 Kent's Com. 620-621;
1 Parsons on Contracts 44-45; Bickford vs. Menier, 107 N. Y. 490-14 N.
E. 438; American Sales Book Co. vs.
Whitaker, 100Ark. 360-140S. W. 13237 L.R.A. (NS) 91;Dispatch Printing
Co. vs. National Bank. of Commerce
109 Minn. 440-124 N. W. 236-50 L.
R. A. (NS) 74; Upton vs. Suffolk
County Mills 11 Cush. (Mass.) 58659 Am. Dec. 163; Waupaca Elec. Go.
vs. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. Co. 112 Wis.
469-88 N. W. 308; Troy Grocery Co.
vs. Potter 139 Ala. 359-36 S. W. 12;
Lindow vs. Cohn (Cal.) 90 Pac. 485;
Peterson vs. Wood Mach. Co. 97
Iowa 148-66 N. W. 96-59 Am. St.
Rep. 399.
Whether the agent's authority be
express or implied, general or special, the party dealing with the agent
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is bound to take notice of the nature
and extent of such authority and
should make inquiry to ascertain the
same. Mecham on Agency, Section
273; Story on Agency, Sec. 125 et seq.
This is true of the commercial traveler's authority, which as a general
rule extends only to soliciting orders
for goods. 6 Am. & Eng. Enc. of
Law 224.
What are the facts as disclosed by
the record? That Forest E. Rohrer
was the agent of the appellant is admitted; and that he had authority to
obtain from appellee, Samuel Koontz,
the note and contract declared on in
this action is, of course, necessarily
admitted. It is also admitted that
said Rohrer had authority to sell to
Koontz the stock powders and dips
of the appellant as consideration for
the note and contract set out in the
But appelamended declaration.
lant denies that his said agent had
any authority, e.xpress or implied, to
effect such sale to the appellee upon
the further consideration and conditions of agreement alleged in the second count of plea.
What authority did appellant's
agent have in the transaction with
appellee, and what notice of such
authority or limitation thereof was
brought to the appellee? The blank
form of contract supplied by the appellant and used by the agent, Rohrer, contained on its face, printed at
the bottom thereof and below the
purchaser's signature, the following
note: "No contract or agreement
other than what appears on the face
of this order shall bind the Pioneer
Stock Powder Company." Is appellee chargeable with notice on account
of this note? If the appellee had actual notice of the limitation of authority, by having read the note, or
having the same read to him or call-

ed to his attention, he would be bound
by such limitation. Does this note,
as a matter of law, constitute constructive notice, binding upon the appellee in the absence of actual notice? Tothispoint a Wisconsin judge
writes this opinion: "On the face of
the bill sent to the defendant, and directly under his address, there appears in large, legible print in red
ink, as if stamped upon it, the words
'Agents not authorized to collect' * " *
If these words so legible and prominent on the face of the bill, would not
be notice, it would seem to be impossible to give a purchaser such a
notice. By all authorities he must
be presumed to have observed these
words, and to have had such notice,
where they were so prominent on the
face of the bill of goods in his possession, and in which he alone was interested as purchaser." Orton, J. in
McKinley vs. Dunham 55 Wis. 51542 Am. Rep. 740. Most of the decided cases on this point, however, do
not go to the extent of holding such
writing to be sufficient in itself as
constructive notice to bind the purchaser, but hold that it is a question
of fact whether or not actual notice
was thereby given the purchaser.
Putnam vs. French 53 Vt. 402-38
Am. Rep. 682; Trainor vs. Morrison
78 Me. 160-57 Am. Rep. 790; Wass
vs. M. M. Ins. Co. 61 Me. 537; Kensmann vs. Kershaw 119 Mass. 140;
Law vs. Stokes 32 N. J. L. 249-90
Am. Dec. 655.
We are not disposed to follow the
Wisconsin case doctrine of constructive notice, but prefer to adopt the
holding of the other courts. The law
of constructive notice does not, as a
general rule, apply to such transactions, but leaves the party having
the burden of proving notice in any
case for any purpose, to establish it
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by proof of actual notice; such at- such circumstance and the nature of
tempts as this to give written no- the business should put a purchaser
tice having probative force in evi- on inquiry.
dence, according to the nature and
As part of the contract entered
circumstances of the particular case. .into with appellee the appellant, by
In the present case there appears no itsagent, agreed "to come and ride,
evidence whatever tending to estab- advertise for and with Samuel
lish actual notice of the provision Koontz to help sell and make him
printed on the face of the contract safe in the Pioneer bill of goods."
form limiting the authority of appel- Appellant, assuming this to be a
lant's agent to the procurement of contract for advertisinghisprincipal's
the execution of such printed form business, presents the following
contract. Certain it is that the pro- point and authority in his brief: "A
vision in question does not constitute traveling salesman's implied authoriany part of the contract itself; nor ty does not include authority to condoes it prevent the execution of a tract for advertising his employer's
United States Bedding
valid contract in any other form business."
within the scope of the agent's au- Co. vs. V. J. Andre (Ark.) 150 S.
thority. This is clearly decided by W. 413-41 L. R. A. (NS) 1019. This
the case of Somers vs. Hibbard, Spen- was a case wherein Andre, a bill
cer, Bartlett Co. 153 Ill. 102-38 N. poster of Osceola, brought action to
E. 899, where the Supreme Court recover forty-four dollars from the
says: "The mere fact that appellants United States Bedding Co., a mercanwrote their acceptance on a blank tile corporation of Memphis, Tenn.,
form for letters at the top of which which had in its employ a traveling
were printed the words: 'All sales salesman who was authorized to sosubject to strike and accidents,' no licit orders for and make sales of
more make these words part of the goods. This company had a custocontract than they made the words mer in Osceola to whom it sent large
there prifnted, 'Sommers Bros. & Co., printed advertisements. It is allegof Box-Annealed ed that this agent contracted with
Mantifacturers
Common and Refined Sheet Iron,' a this bill poster for posting these bills
part of the contract. The offer was for the company. This was the simabsolute. The written acceptance ple contract; nothing else involved.
which they themselves wrote was Comment by comparison or contrast
just as absolute. The printed words is hardly required to show that there
were not in the body of the letter or is no analogy in point of fact or prinOf
referred to therein. The fact that ciple between the two cases.
they were printed at the head of course, the agent of a mercantile
their letter heads would not have the company who is authorized to solicit
effect of preventing appellants from orders for and sell goods to merentering into an unconditional con- chants, has no authority, express or
tract of sale." The case of Johns vs. implied, to contract with a bill posJaycox 67 Wash. 403-121 Pac. 854- ter to post bills. Had this agent
1913d Am. Ann. Cas. 471, cited by contracted with the merchant to pay
appellant, states that the agent's au- for posting these bills as part of the
thority can hardly be limited by the consideration for the purchase and
forms of contract he carries, but that sale of his principal's goods, and
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such principal, while refusing to
recognize that part of the contract
to pay for the bill posting, had
brought action to recover for the
price of the goods, then we would
have a case similar to appellant's. As
it is the case cited gives no support
to appellant's appeal.
Appellant also relies on the case
of Johns vs. Jaycox et al, supra. This
case is analogous in the facts of its
original transaction involved.
A
selling agent, using a printed form
of contract for the sale of 200 talking machines, in order to effect a
sale, added to such form of contract
in writing a guaranty that "purchaser would sell 25 records on average
to each machine given away four
months from date customer has received machine."
The court held
that this added provision to the contract of sale was so extraordinary in
character, so foreign to the powers
and purposes of the agency, as not
to bind the principal, and held, in
the purchaser's action against the
principal on the counterclaim, that
the purchaser could not recover on
the guaranty. But in the plaintiff's
branch of the case, which is decidedly against appellant's position and
right of recovery in this case, it was
also held that the principal could not
have recovered upon the contract so
executed by its agent, if the purchaser had not subsequently in express
terms agreed to waive the unauthorized guaranty and accept the terms
of the original contract as approved
by the principal. It was therefore
solely by reason of the principal's
subsequent express repudiation of
its agent's guaranty to the purchaser, and the purchaser's consequent
agreement to accept the talking machines under the contract without
such guaranty, that the principal

was held entitled to recover. The
case as a precedent therefore is
against appellant.
For the same
reason that the principal could not
recover on the contract as executed
by the agent in the case cited, the appellant cannot recover in this case.
There is nothing extraordinary or
unusual in the authority exercised
by appellant's agent, nor in the nature of the contract entered into with
appellee. It is not an uncommon
thing for a company, in consideration
for the purchase of a large bill of its
-goods, to contract to make the purchaser the exclusive sales agent in a
certain territory, to define such territory, and also to agree to ride and
help advertise such goods for the
purpose of introducing them in such
territory. Furthermore there is no
evidence of any express grant of authority which restricted appellant's
agent to negotiating unconditional
sales. As already seen the form
blanks used were not sufficient to do
so. There is ample evidence to sustain the verdice upon the theory that
appellant's agent had such authority
as general agent to make sales as
would authorize the contract entered
into with appellee.
There is also evidence in the record to sustain the verdict upon the
theory of ratification. Such ratification may be either express or implied. If the principal on being informed of the acts of his agent fails
for an unreasonable length of time
to repudiate the unauthorized acts,
ratification will be presumed as matter of law 21 R. C. L. 930. Sec. 99;
Union Gold Mining Co. vs. Rocky
Mountain Nat. Bank 96 U. S. 640-24
L. Ed. 648; Brook & Co. vs. Cunningham Bros. (Ga.) 90 S. E. 1037;
Reese vs. Medlock 27 Tex. 120-84
Am. Dec. 611.
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If the jury found that the alleged
agency existed either by appointment
or ratification, then appellant is barred from recovering in this case, because he does not even pretend to
have furnished the consideration
contracted for under his agent's contract. But there is another proposition of law that absolutely precludes appellant's recovery in this
case and sustains the verdict of the
jury. Mecham on Agency 89, Sec.
130, says: "It is a fundamental rule
that if the principal elects to ratify
any part of the unauthorized act he
must ratify the whole of it. He cannot avail himself of it so far as it is
advantageous to him and repudiate
its obligations; and the rule applies
when his ratification is express and
also when it is implied." 2 Corpus
Juris 483 and cases cited; 21 R. C. L.
932, Sec. 111. In the case of Jones
vs. Jaycox, supra, cited by appellant,
involving the extraordinary and unauthorized warranty added to the
printed forms of contract supplied
the agent, the court said: "There is
no question that, if the principal elect
to ratify a contract which the agent
was not authorized to make, he must
ratify the whole of it. If he ratifies
the contract, he ratifies the warranty." In appellant's case, therefore,
if he ratifies the contract of sale, he
also ratifies the agreement that he
"come and ride and advertise for and
with Samue lKoontz, to help sell and
make him safe in the Pioneer bill of
goods." There is .no other contract
to which the appellee gave his assent
and to which under the law of contract he is bound. A case on this
point, one in every particular analogous to appellant's case is Eberts vs.
Selover 44 Mich. 519-38 Am. Rep.
278.
Since the contract which the agent

of appellant entered into with appellee is the only contract that can be
enforced in this case, and since failure of consideration for such contract is admitted on appellant's part,
and since recission thereof has been
made by appellee by payment for
and return shipment of the goods received, appellant's right of action is
barred. The verdict of the jury is
not, therefore, contrary to law.
Finding no error in the record the
judgment of the trial court is in all
things affirmed.
ST JOSEPH LOAN & TRUST COMPANY vs. FIRST NATIONAL
BANK

No. 6.
Negotiable Instruments-Restrictive Indorsement - Notice to Purchasers - Province of Court and Jury-Instructions--Interrogatories.
1. An indorsement as follows: "For
collection, pay to the order of Frank D.
Jones, Cashier" (for the Elkhart National
Bank), is a restrictive or qualified indorsement which not only limits the negotiability
of the check to purposes of collection
merely, while it retains title thereto in the
indorser, but such indorsement constitutes
in itself notice to all subsequent indorsees
and purchasers for value that the party
making the indorsement is the owner of
such check and entitled to the proceeds of
its collection.
2. A bank whcih collects such check,
after receiving it in due course from the
bank to which it was first sent for collection, cannot apply the proceeds of collection
to the liquidation of a balance due from
that bank, by virtue of their existing agreement and practice to collect and credit to
their respective accounts commercial paper
sent to one another instead of remitting
such proceeds to the sending bank, for the,
sending bank having no title to such check
or proceeds, the collecting bank can acquire
none.
3. The bank which collects a check, so
indorsed is liable to the bank which so indorsed it, in the action of indebtitatus
assumpsit for money had and received, and
it is no defense to such action that there is
no actual privity of contract or legal relation between such banks.
4. A tendered instruction which correctly states the law of a case where the check
negotiated for collection has upon it an unqualified indorsement. is properly refused
in a case where the indorsement is a restrictive one "for collection"; for in the lat-
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ter case the facts that such check was
transferred for collection only and that the
collecting bank had notice thereof, are determinde by the court's construction of the
indorsement as a matter-of law, and are
therefore not facts for the jury to determine as in the other case.
5. Interrogatories which elicit facts
that are immaterial or tend only to contradict the court's construction of a written
indorsement are properly refused.

Action for money had and received, brought by the First National
Bank of Chicago, against the St. Joseph Loan & Trust Co., of South
Bend, Indiana. From a judgment
for plaintiff, the defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Francis J. Murphy and Walter R.
Miller for Appellant.
Delbert D. Smith and Edward
Madigan for Appellee.
The appellee,
VURPILLAT, J.
plaintiff, First National Bank of Chicago, being the owner of two certain
checks for $500 each, indorsed them
as follows: "For collection, pay to
the order of Frank D. Jones, Cashier," said Jones being-the cashier of
the Elkhart National Bank to which
appellee sent the checks for collection. The Elkhart National Bank indorsed the checks by general indorsement, making them payable to the
appellant, the St. Joseph Loan &
Trust Company. There existed at
that time and for a long time prior
thereto an agreement and practice
between the Elkhart National Bank
and the St. Joseph Loan & Trust
Company by which they mutually
collected all the commercial paper
forwarded to one another, and instead of remitting the proceeds of
such collection, credited and charged
the same to their respective accounts.
The appellee collected the checks in
question and, pursuant to said agreement, credited the proceeds thereof
to the Elkhart National Bank, which
was at that time, and ever since has

been, heavily indebted to the St. Joseph Loan & Trust Company in a
large balance on their said account,
towit: $3,000. The Elkhart National Bank became insolvent and has
not paid to the appellee the one
thousand dollars on the checks thus
collected.
The appellee thereupon instituted
this action against the appellant for
money had and received on the two
checks which it had forwarded to the
Elkhart National Bank, having first
made demand upon appellant, St. Joseph Loan & Trust Company, for
such money which was refused. To
the complaint appellant filed answer
in two paragraphs, general denial
and confession and avoidance. The
second paragraph of answer was
stricken out. The cause was submitted to a jury which returned a general verdict together with answers
Judgment was
to interrogatories.
rendered on the verdict in favor of
the plaintiff from which defendant
appeals.
The errors assigned are the overruling of the demurrer to the complaint, the striking out of the second paragraph of answer, overruling the motion for a new trial and
that the verdict is contrary to law.
The first two of the alleged errors
are not discussed by appellant's
counsel in their briefs and are therefore waived according to the rules of
the appellate courts. However, the
complaint for money had and received is in the common form prescribed
and sufficiently alleges all operative
facts, including demand and refusal,
to constitute a cause of action. 14
Enc. of Pleading & Practice 53, and
cases there cited. And the second
paragraph of appellee's answer was
properly stricken out as a sham
pleading. 20 Enc. of Pldg. & Pr. 1;
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Brown County Bank vs. Lewis 18
Wend. (N. Y.) 566; Beeson vs McConnaha 12 Ind. 440.
The verdict of the jury is not contrary to law. The law of negotiable
paper is the law of this case., The
checks in question are negotiable instruments, and the construction
which the court, as a matter of law,
must give to the indorsement placed
on the checks by the appellee, is decisive of the rights of the parties and
of the issues in this case. The indorsement, "For collection, pay to the
order of Frank D. Jones, Cashier"
(of the Elkhart National Bank), is a
restictive or qualified indorsement
which not only operates to limit the
negotability of the checks to purposes of collection merely, while it retains title thereto in the indorser,
but such indorsement constitutes of
itself notice to all subsequent indorsees and purchasers for value,
that the party making such indorsement is the owner of such checks and
entitled to the proceeds of their collection. 1 Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, Sec. 698; Edwards on
Bills & Notes, Sec. 277; Bank of the
Metropolis vs. First National Bank
of Jersey City 19 Fed. 301; First National Bank of Chicago vs. Reno
County bank 3 Fed. 257; White vs.
National Bank 102 U. S. 658; Claflin vs. Wilson 51 Iowa 15.
In the case of Bank of Metropolis
vs. First National Bank, supra, the
indorsement was, "For collection,
pay to the order of 0. L. Baldwin,
cashier," which in every detail is
like the indorsement here. In First
National Bank vs. Reno County
Bank, supra, the indorsement was,
"Pay to the order of Hetherngton &
Co., on account of the First National Bank, Chicago."
Concerning
these two indorsements, the Federal

court in the latter case says: "Under
either form of indorsement the natural and reasonable implication to
all persons dealing with the paper
would seem to be that the owner has
authorized the endofsee to collect it
for the owner, and conferred upon
him a qualified title for this purpose
and for no other."
Appellant contends that it became
the owner of the checks in due course
and for value; that by virtue of the
Elkhart National Bank's general indorsement, it became prima facie the
owner of the checks, and that, by
reason of its agreement and practice
with said bank, in applyng the proceeds of the collecton of the checks
to the existing debt of said bank, it
was a purchaser for value and entitled to a lien on such proceeds no
matter who was the owner of the
checks. The case of the Bank of the
Metropolis vsl New England Bank,
1 Howard 234-11 L. Ed. 234 is cited
in support of the contention. The
facts of the tvo cases are analogous
with the material exception that in
the case cited the New England
Bank, in sending its check to the
Commonwealth Bank for collection,
did so by a general indorsement
which, in legal effect, transfers an
unqualified and perfect title; while
in appellant's case, the appellee, the
First National Bank, in sending the
checks in question to the Elkhart
National Bank for collection, did so
by a restrictive indorsement, which,
in legal effect, transfers only a qualified title "for collection." In the
case cited the Bank of the Metropolis could become an innocent purchaser for value without notice of
the New England Bank's claim, and
could therefore apply them to the account of the Commonwealth Bank
under ther agreement; but appellant,
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St. Joseph Loan & Trust Co., could
not become a purchaser without notice of appellee's claim, because the
restrictive indorsement itself was
notice to appellant that appellee had
retained its title to the checks and
the proceeds of their collection, and
that appellee could acquire no better
title han had been transferred to the
Elkhart National Bank, to-wit: Title
"for collection" only.
In the case of the First National
Bank vs. Reno County Bank, supra,
which involves the restrictive indorsement and is in all respects analogous to appellant's case, and in
which the same contention was made
and the same case cited in support
thereof, the U. S. Circuit Court
makes this distinction: "It will be
seen that the case (Bank of Metropolis vs. New England Bank) was decided upon the ground that the paper was indorsed so as to show,
prima facie, a perfect title in the indorsee, thus enabling the latter to
use it as its own, and to get credit on
the faith of absolute ownership. It
is clear that had the indorsement
been restricted in its sharacter, so
as to show the continued ownership
of the New England Bank, the result would have been different."
And in another part of the opinion
the same court says: "The defendant's (Appellee's) claim, that it had
a right to apply the proceeds of the
checks collected by it to the liquidation of the claim against the Mastin
(Elkhart National) Bank, is entirely
without merit. There is not a shadow of ground for holding that the
defendant believed the paper belonged to the Mastin (Elkhart) Bank.
The indorsement of that bank declares in plain words "for collection,"
so that the defendant (appellee) wad
definitely informed that the Mastin

(Elkhart) Bank did not own the
check."
To sustain appellant's contention
the court would be compelled to expressly overrule the decision of the
United States Circuit Court for the
Southern District of New York in
the case of Bank of Metropolis vs.
First National Bank of Jersey City,
supra. After stating the facts of
that case, which are in perfect analogy to the facts of this case, that
court says: "Upon these facts it is
clear that the relations between the
defendant and the Newark Bank in
respect to paper received by the former from the latter for collection
were those of debtor and creditor,
and not merely of agent and principal, (Morse, Banks, 52) and the defendant, having received the paper
with the right to appropriate its proceeds upon general account as a credit to offset or apply to any indebtedness existing or to accrue from the
Newark Bank growing out of the
transactions between the two banks,
was a holder for value. Since the decision in Swift vs Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, it
has been the recognized doctrine of
the federal courts that one who acquires negotiable paper in payment
or as security for a pre-existing indebtedness is a holder for value,
(Nat. Bank of the Republic vs.
Brooklyn city, etc., R. Co. 14 Blatchf.
242, affirmed, 102 U. S. 14), and if
the defendant had been justified in
assuming that such paper was the
property of the Newark Bank, it
would have been entitled to a lien
upon it for a balance of account, no
matter who was the real owner of
the paper. Bank of Metropolis vs.
New England Bank, 1 Howard 234.
But the checks bore the indorsement
of the plaintiff in a restricted form.
signifying that the plaintiff had nev-
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er parted with his title to them. In
the terse statement of Gibson, C. J.,
'a negotiable bill or note is a courier
without luggage; a memorandum to
control it, though indorsed upon it
would be incorporated with it and
destroy it' Overton vs. Tyler, 3 Pa.
St. 348. The indorsement by plaintiff 'for collection' was notice to all
parties subsequentl
dealing with
the checks that the plaintiff did not
intend to transfer the title of the paper, or the ownership of the proceeds, to another. As was held in
Cecil Bank vs. Bank of Maryland,
22 Md. 148, the legal import and effect of such indorsement was to notify the defendant that the plaintiff
was the owner of the checks, and
that the Newark Bank was merely
its agent for collection."
Nor can appellant's contention
prevail that there is no privity of
contract or other legal relation between appellant and appellee in this
case, for, as stated by the court in
the case of the Metropolis vs. First
National Bank, supra, "It has long
been settled that want of privity is
no obpection to the action of indebtitatus assumpsit for money had and
received. See note A, appendix, 1
Cranch 367 (2 L. Ed. 139), where
the authorities are collated." The
doctrine applicable to the action for
money had and received is announced by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Hall vs. Marston, 17
Mass. 574-579 as follows: "Whenever one man has in his hands the
money of another, which he ought to
pay over, he is liable to this action
(assumpsit) although he has never
seen nor heard of the party who has
the right. When the fact is proved
that he has the money, if he cannot
show that he has legal or equitable
ground for retaining it, the law

creates the privity and the promise."
This doctrine as here stated is expressly approved in First National
Bank of Chicago vs. Reno County
Bank, supra.
Appellant alleges as cause for new
trial the refusal to give the following
instruction properly tendered, to-wit:
If you find from the evidence that
the Elkhart National Bank did for
a period of years transact business
with the defendants, the St. Joseph
Loan & Trust Company of South
Bend, Indiana; and did from time to
time transmit notes and other commercial paper to the said defendants
for collection, which were treated by
both parties as the property of the
other, unless an indorsement on such
paper was of such a nature as to convey notice as to the outstanding
equity in such negotiable paper by a
third person; and if you find that the
checks in this case were transmitted
in the ordinary course of business
between the two banks aforesaid and
were held by the defendant, and while
thus held, the said Elkhart National
Bank became insolvent, and that
there was at that time a large balance on general account due said defendants, the St. Joseph Loan &
Trust Company, from said Elkhart
National Bank; and that in the collection of such negotiable paper from
one another the said banks would not
remit the proceeds to the transmitting bank in each particular instance,
but instead would debit and credit
each other, as the case might be, in
a book called a collection register;
and that at the time of the insolvency
of the said Elkhart National Bank,
the balance due defendants from said
Elkhart National Bank by reason of
such collections, was an amount in
excess of the amount of the checks
collected, to-wit: $3,000; therefore
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you must find for the defendant and
against the plaintiff, since said defendant is entitled to the proceeds
of such collection until such balance
is paid."
The appellant again relies on the
case of the Bank of Metropolis vs.
New England Bank, supra, in which
the refusal of the trial court to give
a similar instruction was held to
constitute reversible error. In both
cases the plaintiff banks had the burden of proving that the checks had
been transferred by them for the
purpose of collection only, and that
the collecting banks received the
checks with notice of that fact. In
the case cited it was the province of
the jury to determine these facts under proper instructions of the court,
because the indorsement on the
check, being general, passed perfect
title to the check and conveyed no notice whatever of the indorsing bank's
claim. It was therefore error to refuse the instruction which properly
stated the law applicable to the facts
of that case. In appellant's case,

however, the facts that appellee negotiated its checks "for collection"
only, and that appellant had notice
thereof, were established by the restricted indorsement itself which it
was the duty of the court alone to
construe as a matter of law, and such
facts thus established could not be
submitted to the jury for finding.
The instruction, therefore, had no
application to this case and was properly refused. Indeed, had the judgment been for appellant, it would
have constituted reversible error to
have given it.
Appellant also complains of the
trial- court's refusal to submit to the
jury two certain interrogatories.
Neither of these had material application to the issues, and both tended
to contradict the legal effect of the
limited indorsement, and were therefore properly refused.
There is no error in the trial
court's record and the judgment of
the Notre Dame Circuit Court is
therefore affirmed.
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BRIEF OF LEO J. HASSENAUER in CASE OF DUFF AS
PIONEER STOCK POWDER CO. vs. KOONTZ.
In the Notre Dame Supreme Court.
Chas. E. Duff, doing business under
the name and style of The Pioneer
Stock Powder Company, Appellant,
VS.
Samuel Koontz, Appellee.
Brief for Appellant.
NATURE OF THE ACTION
This is an action in special assumpsit, by which the plaintiff seeks
judgment against the defendant for
damages alleged to have been sustained by him on account of a breach
of contract, the non-payment of a
note given for the purchase of stock
powders and dips, and assigned to
plaintiff, upon becoming the sole
owner of The Pioneer Stock Powder
Company.
WHAT THE ISSUES WERE
The issues as formed consisted of
the declaration in two counts; the
first count alleging that the plaintiff
became sole owner of the Pioneer
Stock Powder Company, and all accounts and notes due the said company, by an assignment without recourse from the former owner. That
he is the sole owner of a promissory
note, set out in the declaration, executed to the company and signed by
the defendant, Samuel Koontz. That
said note is due and unpaid. And for
his second count, plaintiff ileges that
the defendant, and plaintiff by his
agent entered into a certain agreement in which defendant agreed to
buy and pay for a certain amount of
powders and dips, products of The
Pioneer Stock Powder Co., and plaintiff agreed to sell and ship the same.

That plaintiff has wholly performed
his part of the agreement. That upon demand defendant failed to pay
as per the signed agreement.
The defendant filed a general demurrer which was overruled; defendant then filed a plea in five counts
to which the plaintiff files a similiter
and replication to the 2nd, 3rd, and
fourth counts of plea. The jury
broukht in a verdict for defendant.
Plaintiff then filed a motion for new
trial in four paragraphs which was
deniel by the court. Whereupon the
plaintiff doth appeol to the court of
last resort.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
1. That the verdict is contrary to
the evidence;
2. That the verdict is contrary to
the law and evidence;
3. The court erred in overruling
plaintiff's motion for new trial.
Condensed statement of the evidence. (Omitted from publication.)
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
1. "A party dealing with the
agent must ascertain the scope and
reach of the power delegated to such
agent, and must abide by the consequences if he transcends them."
Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank vs
Butchers & Drovers' Bank, 16 N. Y.
125 69 Am. Dec. 678; Monson et al.
vs Kill, 33 N. E. 43 (Ill.) 242 Ill. 43490 N. E. 298; Hartensbower et al. vs.
Uden et al. 28 L. S. A. NS. 738.
2. "A traveling salesmanp implied authority does not include authority to contract for advertising
his employer's business." (Ark.)
150 S. W. 413; United States Bed-
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ding Company, vs. V. J. Andre, 41
L. R. A. NS. 1019.
3.
The law in relation to the
agent's authority is thus stated in 6
Am. and Eng. Enc. of Law, page 224:
Sec. 1. "The scope of a commercial
traveler's authority is well defined,
and as a general rule, extends only
to the soliciting of orders for goods."
Sec. 2.
"Third parties dealing
with him are bound, at their peril to
ascertain his real powers; and the
mere statement of the salesman that
he is authorized to do any unusual
act will not be sufficient o bind the
principal."
4. "While a selling agent's authority cannot be limited by the form of
blank contracts he carries, such contracts and the nature of the business
may be sufficient to put the purchaser
on inquiry." John vs. Jaycox, 67
Wash. 403-121 Pac. 854-Anno. Cases.
5. Judge Story, Commentaries on
the law of Agency, Sec. 126, Sec. 133.
"Where the agency is not held out
by the principal, by any acts, or declarations, or implications, to be general in regard to the particular act
or business it must from necessity be
construed according to its real nature and extent; and the purchaser
must act at his own peril, and iF
bound to inquire into the nature and
extent of the authority actually conferred. In such a case there is no
ground to contend that the principal
ought to be bound by the acts of the
agent, beyond what he has apparently authorized; because he has not
misled the confidence of the other
party, who has dealt with the agent.
"The duty of inquiring, then, is incumbent on such party,since the principal has never held the agent out as
having any general authority whatsoever in the premises; and, if he
trusts without inquiry, he trusts to
the good faith of the agent, and not
to that of the principal."

ARGUMENT
The appellant's 1st, 3rd, and 5th
paragraphs of Points and Authorities are considered together in his argument.
The evidence discloses these parties had no usual course of dealing
between themselves. It is clear under the facts in this record that instead of anything appearing to cause
the defendant to believe the contract
was one within the agent's apparent
authority, as being usual and ordinary in the course of such business,
the case of an extraordinary and unusual proposition is presented, so
unreasonable and so entirely repugnant to the usual course of conduct
pursued by business concerns that
this defendant being governed by the
standard of an ordinarily prudent
business man must have known, and,
in fact, every reasonable inference
from the proof shows that he might
have known the authority of the
salesman to that extent was improbable. He should therefore be precluded from asserting the apparent
authority of the ageht to make the
contract, which, if made, and was
binding in every case ,would probably result in entailing bankruptcy
upon the most stable manufacturers
and wholesalers who attempted to
sustain their credit by abiding such
conditions.
Now, it is certain a salesman having no express authority to enter into
such a contract, his principal can
only become obligated by the act of
the agent in that behalf upon one of
two theories. First, the principal
would be bound on the doctrine of
ratification; or, secondly, the principal would, of course, be bound by the
act of the agent if the contract made
by him was within the apparent
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scope of the agent's authority. This
responsibility of the principal for the
acts his agent, not expressly autlhorized, is limited however, to such acts
as are within the apparent scope of
the authority conferred; that is to
say, it is implied, of course, that an
agent on the road, such as a traveling salesman, for the sale. of goods
to various persons, has the authority
to employ all the necessary and proper means for the accomplishment of
the sale which are justified by and
consistent with the usages of th.e
trade. The law presumes, and those
dealing with the agent have the right
to act upon this presumption of the
law, that the agent is authorized to
sell the goods in the usual manner,
and only in the usual manner, and
make such contracts thereabout as
are reasonable or competent with the
usage and custom of the trade in like
undertakings, and it is to this extent
and this extent only that an agent
may be said as a matter of law to be
acting within the scope of his apparent authority. That it is the duty of
third persons dealing with the agent
in contracts of this nature to inquire
as to the extent of his authority. 6
6 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, page
224.
Judge Story, Commentaries on the
Law of Agency, Sec. 126, Sec. 133.
Monson et al. vs. Kill,. 33 N. E. 43.
Hartenbower et al. vs. Uden et al.
28 L. R. A. NS .738.
Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank vs.
Butchers' & Drovers' Bank, 69 Am.
Dec. 678.
Therefore, if the authority which
the traveling salesman assumes to
exercise in and about the consummation of the sale of such goods is of
such an unusual, improbable and extraordinary character as would be

sufficient to place a reasonably prudent business man in dealing with
him, upon his guard, the party so
dealing will not be justifiefifid flinSfi
dealing will not be justified in disregarding his senses and overlooking
the real situation and thereafter seek
to hold the principal, upon the theory
that the contract was within the
agent's apparent scope of his authority. Under such circumstances it is
the duty of the party dealing with
the agent to either refuse to close negotiations with him at all, or first
proceed to ascertain from the principal whether the true scope of his
authority is such as will authorize
the extraordinary and unusal cuontract proposed. The principal last
mentioned, not only comports with
the ends of justice sought to be attained by the established law of principal and agent, but is in fact one of
the fundamentals of our entire system of jurisprudence.
The further question to be decided
is: A traveling salesman's implied
authority does not include authority
to contract for advertising his employer's. business or goods. The decision finds support in the one reported case Which has been found. In
United States Bedding Company vs.
V. J. Andre, 41 L. R. A. NS. 1019,
the material facts were:
The defendant had in its employ a
traveling salesman who was authorized to solicit orders for and make
sales of goods. Among its customers
was a retail firm to whom, in shipping goods, it also sent out large posters, those advertisements which
could be posted on bill boards. The
plaintiff claimed that he had entered
into a contract with defendant's
salesman whereby he was employed
to post said advertisements on his
bill-boards. The defendant denied
that such contracts were entered into
by its salesmen, and blaimed that if
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it was, he was unauthorized to make
it.
The just court of Arkansas, rendered the following decision in the
above reported case:
"The agent's implied authority is
limited to those acts which are of
like kind with the very act he is expressly empowered to do, and from
which the authority is implied; but
his authority can never be extended
by implication to do an act or make
an agreement which is beyond the
obvious purpose of his employment.
The purpose fo rwhich a traveling
salesman is employed is to solicit orders and make sales of goods. Unless he is specially authorized to do
so, he has no implied authority to do
any act other than is usually done by
other salesmen of like character;
that is, to do those things and make
those agreements which are necessary and usual to accomplish the
purpose of the agency. Being employed for one purpose, he has no
authority to do another, either actual
or implied.
This learned court further held:

production of an extra blank after
the stereotyped form had been filled
out and signed should have put the
defendant, Samuel Koontz, on his
guard regarding the signing of a separate contract different from the
stereotyped form signed at the consummation of the original contract.
In the case of John vs. Jaycox,
(Wash.) 121 Pac. 854-1913 D 471,
Am. & Eng. Anno. Case. the material facts were:

An action was brought to recover
a balance due upon a written contract for two hundred talking machanes, sold by the plaintiff's agent.
The agent caused the defendant to
execute a written form of contract
which he carried and for executing
the same the agent gave defendant a
written guaranty that they would sell
a certain amount of machines each
week. The appellants contend that
the memorandum was never a part
of the contract because the agent had
no authority to make it.
The court in deciding the main
question said in part as follows:
"While an agent's authority can
"The power to make contracts for
advertising cannot be implied from hardly be limited by the form of
the power to sell goods and solicit blanks he carries, that circumstance
orders, and therefore it is not within and nature of the business should
the apparent scope of the authority put a purchaser on inquiry. The apof the traveling salesman in this case parent scope of his authority was
to make. Aperson dealing with an that of a sales agent, and it is upon
agent is at once put upon notice of the powers implied by that relation
the limitation of his authority, and that any souhd decision must rest. To
must ascertain what that authority hold, as contended by counsel, that
is.,
the appellant, without knowledge, or
ratification, should be estopped to
In concluding the court said:
question the guaranty because the
"As a matter of law, therefore, the respondents had placed themselves,
power to make the contract was not in a position where they must have
within the apparent scope of the the machines in reliance upon the
quaranty, would be to hold that the
agent's authority."
principal would be bound in almost
A further extraordinary feature every instance by the unauthorized
about this transaction is that the de- acts of the agent however palpably
fendant, Samuel Koontz, freely con- beyond the scope of his employment."
tracted with the agent regardless of
CONCLUSION
inquiry concerning the blank form of
In conclusion the appellant believes
contract which the agent carried, the he is entitle dto a judgment on two
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theories; that a traveling salesman
may not obligate his principal, as
within the scope of his apparent authority, by a positive agreement or
contract in connection with the sale
of goods, which agreement or contract was without the scope and beyond his express authority, and
which was not an ordinary or usual
contract, comporting with any custom or usage of the trade; that it was
the duty of the appellee, to ascertain
the extent and scope of the agen's

auhority upon being asked to execute
two different and dissimilar contracts relating to the same subject
matter in question.
Wherefore the appellant prays
that the learned Supreme Court of
Notre Dame will remand the case to
the trial Court with instructions to
grant the appellant a ne wtrial.
Respectfully submitted to the
Honorable, the Supreme Court of
Notre Dame, Indiana, for just consideration and solution.
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BRIEF OF CLIFFORD O'SULLIVAN IN CASE OF DUFF

AS PIONEER STOCK POWDER CO. vs. KOONTZ.
In the Notre Dame Supreme Court.
Chas. E. Duff, doing business under
the name and style of The Pioneer
Stock Powder Company, Appellant,
VS.
Samuel Koontz, Appellee.

ship the same. That the plaintiff
has wholly performed his part of the
agreement. That upon demand defendant failed to pay as per the alleged agreement.

The defendant then filed his plea
in five counts. The first count was a
general traverse. In his second
Brief for Appellee.
count the defendant pleads a written
contract, set out in plea, entered into
NATURE OF THE ACTION
by The Pioneer Stock Powder ComThis is an action in special assump- pany through its agent, whereby it
sit by which the plaintiff seeks judg- was agreed that, if the defendant
ment against the defendant for dam- would take a certain amount of the
ages alleged to have been sustained products of the said company, he
on account of breach of contract, the would be buying the right and would
non-payment of a note alleged to be allowed to sell the products, and
have been given for the purchase of that the company would map out for
Stock Powders and Dips, and assign- him a certain territory in which he
ed to plaintiff upon his becoming the was to work, and that the company
sole owne rof The Pioneer Stock would send its agent to help him sell
Powder Company.
and advertise the said products.
That the defendant was to do nothWHAT THE ISSUES WERE
ing until the company should send
The plaintiff filed a declaration in its agent. That said written agreetwo counts to which the defendant
ment was part of the orgiinal confiled a general and special 'demurrer. tract of which the note was a part
The court sustained the demurrer
and that The Pioneer Stock Powder
and the plaintiff then filed an amend- Company's promise to help sell the
ed declaration in two counts; the products and to send its agent and
first count alleging that the plaintiff to map out a territory in which the
became the sole owner of The Pio- defendant was to work was the sole
neer Stock Powder Company and all and only consideration for his, the
accounts and notes due the said defendant's, signing his promissory
company. That he is sole owner of note.
note set out in declaration. That
The defendant further alleges that
said note is due and unpaid.
the goods were shipped to him and
And for his second count, the that he housed them and cared for
plaintiff alleges that the defendant
them and waited for the Pioneer
and the plaintiff by his agent enter- Stock Powder Company to send its
ed into a certain agreement in which agent and to map out a territory in
the defendant agreed to buy for a which he was to work. That he sent
certain amount of powders and dips, a letter to the Company requesting
products of the plaintiff company them to send its agent. That The
and the plaintiff agreed to sell and Pioneer Stock Powder Company nev-
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er did send its agent and never did
2.
"Express authority permits
map out a territory for him as per the agent to adopt any recognized
the agreement. That he shipped the usage or mode of dealing."
goods back to the Pioneer Stock PowKaufman vs. The Farley Mfg. Co.
der Company. That he has wholly 78 Ia. 679; 43 N. W. 612, 16 A. S. R.
performed his part of the contract 462.
so far as he was permitted to do and
Duncan vs. Hartman, 143 Pa. St.
was prevented from complying fur- 595, 22 Atl. 1099, 24 A. S. R. 570.
ther by reason of the acts of the
Rohrbough vs. U. S. Express Co.
plaintiff, but he says that The Pio- 40 S. E. 398, 88 A. S. R. 849.
neer Stock Powder Company has
3. "If the principal on being inwholly failed and refused to keep formed of the acts of the agent fails
and perform the conditions imposed to disavow them within a reasonable
on it by the said agteement. Where- time hi ssilence may be considered
fore the defendant says that he has and as an acquiescence and assent to
received no part of the consideration the acts done and ratification will be
for the execution of the contract sued presumed."
upon.
Union Gold Mining Co. vs. Rocky
The defendant alleged payment Mountain Nat. Bank, 96 U. S. 640, 24
and failure of consideration for his L. Ed. 648; Brook vs. Cunningham,
third, fourth, and fifth count of his
(Ga.) 90 S. W. 1037; Eau Claireplea.
Canning Co. vs. Western Brokerage
To the defendant's plea the plain- Co., 213 Ill. 561-73 N. E. 430; Whittiff filed a replication to the second, ley vs. Jones (Ga.) 49 S. E. 600.
third, fourth, and fifth counts and a
ARGUMENT
similiter to the first.
TTie jury
The
counsel
for the appellant has
brougth in a verdict for the defendin
his
excellent
brief confined the arant. Plaintiff filed a motion for a
gument
in
support
of his contention
new trial which was denied by the
to
two
theories.
First
that the act
court. Judgment was rendered and
of
the
agent
in
executing
the contract
this appeal was brought.
with
appellee
was
not
within
the imEvidence.
(Omitted from publiplied or apparent scope of his authorcation.)
ity and therefore the principal is not
bound by such contract; and secondPOINTS AND AUTHORITIES
ly that the contract in question was
1. "Express authority of an agent so unreasonable and so repugnant to
is that which the principal directly the usual course of conduct pursued
grant sto him and this includes im- by business concerns that the defendplication whether the agency be gen- ant was bound to inquire into the exeral or special all such powers as are tent of the agent's authority before
necessary and proper as a means of executing such a contract.
effectuating the purpose for which
As to the first point we must comthe agency was created."
pliment the learfied counsel for his
Dispatch Printing Company vs. very masterful treatise of the law on
National Bank of Commerce, 109 the question of the implied powers of
Minn. 440, 124 N. W. 236, 50 L. R A. an agent and the apparent scope of an
N. S.) 74.
agent's authority. However, from
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an examination of the facts as disclosed in the record it is apparent
that all his lengthy argument is entirely beside the issue and for this
reason it will not be our purpose to
attempt to refute the points and authorities that he has cited on the
question of implied and apparent
scope of authority but to show where
these decisions and rules of law are
entirely foreign to the *issue and can
have no application to the questions
and facts involved in this case.
He has proceeded upon the theory
that the acts of the agent in question
could only be considered as being
within the implied powers of the
agent, and has assumed in direct conflict with the evidence in the case that
there was no express authority granted to the agent. The defendant in
the trial of the case in the lower
court never contended or attempted
to show that the agent was acting
within his implied authority but contended and proved that the agent
had express authority to enter into
such a contract on behalf of his principal. The best and most competent
evidence that can be adduced to show
the existence of an agency and to
show the nature of such agency is
the testimony of the principal for
whom the agent acted. In the trial
below the defendant brought upon
the stand Mr. Martin Bernard who
was the principal of this agent at the
time the contract in question was entered into. The witness testified that
he gave his agent express authority
to execute any and all contracts that
would tend to increase the business
of the company.
When asked if
contracts as the one in question were
directly contemplated byr this express
authority, he answered in unequivocal language that it was. He testified that this agent and other agents

of the company had on former occasions executed similar contracts and
that such contracts were the usage
and custom of the company. From
such evidence the jury below found
that the agent was acting under express authority and the counsel for
the appellant is begging the question
when he assumes that there was any
question of implied or apparent
scope of authority involved.
Since it has been shown that the
agent was acting under his express
powers there is no need to discuss
the appellant's second theory, namely that the defendant was bound to
ascertain the scope of the agent's authority. The agency and authority
actually existed and whether or not
the defendant inquired into the nature or extent of this authority can
in no way effect the liability of the
principal.
The second rule of law that the appellee will advance in support of his
contention that the court below was
correct in its findings is th edoctrine
of ratification. In this argument we
will endeavor -to show that regardless
of whether the agent's acts were authorized, the principal is bound upon
the theory of ratification. The record will disclose that the principal in
this case w~s informed of the contract that his agent had executed in
his behalf. That he took no steps to
repudiate the contract and remained
silent as to it. That he even expressed his approval of it and said that he
considered himself bound by it.
In the case of the Union Gold Mining Company of Colorado vs. The
Rocky Mountain National Bank of
Central City, Colorado, the facts in
brief were these:
An agent of the mining company
did in excess of his authority borrow
money in the name of the company.
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He later informed the company of
this act. The company did not repudiate the act of the agent and remained silent on the matter.
The court held that such failure
on the part of the company to repudiate the agent's act on learning of it
from the agent and its continued silence constituted a ratification of
such unauthorized act. In rendering
its decision the learned court said:
"If a company is informed of the
borrowing of morney by its agent in
its name and within a reasonable
time fails to disavow such acts of the
agent,,the jury are authorized to consider the company as assenting to
what was done in its name."
In a similar ease of Whitley vs.
James, 49 S. E. 600, the facts were
these:
An agent of a company did in excess of his authority as agent, extend
credit to certain customers of the
company. Upon learning of this the
company failed to repudiate and remained silent.
The learned court of Georgia in
rendering its dceision in this case and
holding that the principal was bound
said:
"Ratification will result by operation of law from the principal's tacit
acquiescence in such acts for an unreasonable length of time after notice of agent's conduct. That if after
knowledge of what the agent had
done the principal made no objection
for an unreasonable legth of time ratification would result by operation of
law."
The rule laid down in the decisions
of the above briefed cases was upheld in all of the following cases:
McGeoch vs. Hooker 11 Ill. App.
649.
Argus vs. Ware, 136 N. W. 774.
Halloway vs. Arkansas City Mill,
93 Pac. 577.

Hartwell vs. Equitable Mfg. Co.,
97 Pac. 432.
Raymond vs. Palmer, 17 A. S. R.
398.
Russell vs. Waterloo Threshing
Machine Co., 116 N. W. 611.
In all of the above cited cases the
silence and failure of the principal
to repudiate the unauthorized acts of
his agent were construed as a ratification by the -principal of such acts.
The facts as they existed in the case
at issue here are directly in point
with those just cited. The point of
law decided by them is identical with
the one involved here, namely whether silence and failure to repudiate on
the part of the principal with knowledge of the unauthorized acts of his
agent will constitute a ratification
of these acts.
The principal himself when put
upon the stand in the trial o fthe case
below testified that two days after
the execution of the contract in question the agent told him of such contract and explained to him the terms
thereof in full detail. He even testified that on that occasion he expressed his intention to recognize the
contract as binding upon the company of which he was president at
the time. It is quite clear then that
the principal had full gnowledge of
the execution of the contract by his
agent and that he was not uninformed of the provisions and details thereof. It also appears from the record
that the defendant wrote to the company and demanded that the company carry out its part of the con-

tract.
The-record also discloses that the
principal never did in any manner
whatever repudiate the act of his
agent, that he said nothing and did
nothing to signify any intention to
disavow the execution of the con-
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tract.

From such action o rrather

failure to act it must necessarily presumed that he either intended that
the agent should make such a contract or approved of the agent's act.
The decisions and authorities seem
to be in almost perfect accord that
such silence and failure to disavow
on the part of the principal when
possessing full knowledge of the
facts constitute a ratification in
pais.
"Where an agency actually exists,
the mere acquiescence of the principal may well give rise to the conqlusive presumption of an intentional
ratification of the act."
"Long acquiescence without objection and even silence of principal
amount to conclusive presumption of
the ratification of an unauthorized
act."

CONCLUSION
In conclusion the appellee believes
that the decision of the lower court
was correct on two theories; First
that the execution of the contract in
question was within the express
powers of the agent and that there
was no question of implied or apparent scope of authority involved in
this case; and secondly that whether
the agent acted under authority or
not, the principal's failure t orepudiate the act and his continued acquiescence in the act of his agent
constitute a ratification of the act
and the principal is bound.
Wherefore the appellee prays that
the decision of the lower court be, in
all things, affirmed.
All of which is respectfully submitted to the Honorable, the Supreme
Court of Notre Dame.
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NOTRE DAME CIRCUIT COURT
Record
Be It Remembered, That, to-wit:
on Friday, September 22, 1920, the
Notre Dame Circuit Court was duly
organized with Hon. Francis J. Vurpillat as regular Judge presiding,
and the other officers of said court
duly qualified and acting, to-wit:
Henry W. Fritz, Clerk of the Court
and Lawrence Morgan, Sheriff of Notre Dame.
Court was opened in due form and
the following proceedings were had
and orders made, towit:
In re Jury Commissioners for the
year 1920-1921: The court appoints
Frank J. Coughlin and George C.
Wittried, two competent persons, citizens and residents of Notre Dame,
Indiana, to act as Jury Commissioners of said court for the year 19201921, who now come into open court,
accept said trust and are sworn and
qualified for the discharge of the duties of such Jury Commissioners.
The following rules of court were
promulgated and ordered to be
spread of record: (Here insert)
In re Court Stenographers Court
now appoints William S. Allen to be
official court stenographer of the
court for 1920-1921. Comes said
Allen, accepts said trust and is sworn
to discharge the duties of court stenographer.
CAUSE NO. 1.
Joseph Flick
VS.
George Wittried
Frank J. Coughlin and
Alden J. Cusick,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Gerald Craugh and
James L. O'Toole,
Attorneys for Defendant.

Action on account for $500. Complaint and affidavit of merit filed.
Defedant files answer in two paragraphs and affidavit of merit.
Plaintiff files motion to require defendant to make second paragraph
more specific, which is sustained, and
defendant files amended second paragraph of answer, alleging accord and
satisfaction.
Plaintiff files reply in general denial to second paragraph of answer.
Cause submitted to court, a jury
being- waived. Trial had, arguments
heard.
Court finds for plaintiff and renders judgment for $500.
CAUSE NO. 2.
Clyde Walsh
VS.
Charles M. Dunn
Charles P. Mooney and
Joseph D. Sanford,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Archibold M. Duncan and
George Wittried,
Attorneys for Defendant.
Action in Special Assumpsit. Declaration in one count on a promissory note, demand, $200. Affidavit
of merit filed.
Defendant files general demurrer
to the declaration which is overruled,
to which ruling defendant excepts.
Defendant files general issue plea
of non assumpsit and affidavit of
merit. Plea accepted.
Cause submitted to court for trial
without a jury. Arguments are
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heard and the court announces finding for plaintiff in the sum of $200
and costs. Judgment accordingly.
CAUSE NO. 3.
James L. O'Toole
VS.
Joseph Sanford, as Administrator,
Charles M. Dunn and
Edmund Meagher,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Peter Lish and
Norman Barry,
Attorneys for Defendant.
Action on a claim against the estate of John Doe, deceased.
Complaint in one paragraph
against Joseph Sanford, as administrator of the estate of John Doe, deceased.
Defendant filed demurrer to complaint, which plaintiff confesses.
Plaintiff files amended complaint.
Defendant files answer in three
paragraphs, general denial, failure
of consideration and failure to comply with decedent's estates act.
Plaintiff files motion to strike out
the third paragraph of answer which
court overrules, to which ruling
plaintiff excepts.
Plaintiff files reply in three paragraphs.
Defendant moves to strike ou the
second and third paragraphs of reply severally. Court sustains motion
on ground that paragraphs are argumentative general denials. Plaintiff
severally excepts.
Cause at issue is submitted to
court for trial, jury waived.
Arguments are heard and court
finds for plaintiff for $300 as against

the administrator of the estate of
John Doe, deceased, Joseph Sanford,
that said sum is due from said estate
and should be paid by said administrator. Judgment accordingly.
CAUSE NO. 4
Henry Blake
vs.
James Washburn
William S. Allen and
Joseph Sanford
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
George D. O'Brien and
Clyde Walsh,
Attorneys for Defendant.
Action in replevin for the recovery
of a steer. Declaration and affidavit
in replevin flied.
Defendant files plea in two counts,
non cepit and non detinet.
Plaintiff files similiter.
Cause submitted to the court without a jury. Trial begun.
Plaintiff closes case in chief.
Defendant moves for nonsuit,
which the court overrules, to which
ruling defendant excepts.
Trial is concluded and the arguments are heard.
Court finds that the plaintiff is the
owner of and entitled to the immediate possession of the steer described in the declaration and that plaintiff have writ of replevin for such
property and $10 damages for its detention. Judgment on the finding.
CAUSE NO. 5
Charles Dressler
VS.
Nellie Cranford and Walter Cranford
This case pending on the trial calendar for trial before a jury.
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JUNIOR MOOT COURT
The following cases were argued
orally by the respective attorneys
named on the hypothetical facts stated. Only the cases citey by the respective parties appear here. These
cases will later be developed and
submitted for trial in the Notre
Dame Circuit Court by the lawyers
who argued them in this court. The
statements of fact and citations follow:
CAUSE NO. 1.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
John Reilly
VS.
Gerald Davenport
Plaintiff parked his limousine in
Michigan Street, South Bend, Indiana, at right angles with the curbing,
in violaton of a city ordinance. The
defendant, while carelessly and negligently driving his automobile,
crashed into the limousine and damaged it to the extent of $1,000, for
which plaintiff brings action.
Vincent B. Pater and
Aaron H. Huguenard,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Plaintiff should recover, notwithstanding his violation of the city ordinance, for this violation was only
a condition and did not contribute
proximately to the infliction of the
damage. Berry vs. Borough, Pa. 43
Atl. 240; Scheuerer vs. Banner Rubber Co., 38 L. R. A. 1207; Steel vs.
Burkhart, 6 Am. Rep. 191; Spoffard
vs. Harlow, 3 Mass. 176; Railroad
Co. vs. Buck, 115 Ind. 566; Tackett
vs. Taylor, Ia. 98 N. W. 730; Clopper
vs. Coffey, 44 Md. 117; Railroad Co.
vs. Price, Ga. 32 S. E. 77; Rider Case,
N. Y. 63 N. E.

Franklin E. Miller and
John J. Buckley,
Attorneys for Defendant.
The parking of plaintiff's car in
violation of the city ordinance in the
crowded, busy Michigan Street, was
in itself such a negligent act as contributed proximately to the injury
and therefore should bar recovery.
Norris vs. Litchfield, N. H. 69 Am.
Dec. 546; Meyers vs. Meinrath, 101
Mass. 36 -3 Am. Rep. 368; Cranson
vs. Goss, 107 Mass. 309-9 Am. Rep.
45; Cratty vs. City of Bangor, 2 Am.
Rep. 56; Lloyd vs. Pugh, Wis. 149
N. W. 150; Ludke vs. Burek, Wis.
152 N. W. 190; Savett vs. M. & L.
Ry. Co., 77 Am. Dec. 422; Day vs.
Cleveland, etc., Ry. Co., 137 Ind. 206;
Brazil Block Coal Co. vs. Heedler,
129 Ind. 327.
CAUSE NO. 2.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
James Whitcomb
VS.
Marshall Carper
Plaintiff brings action to recover
$200 paid to defendant as purchase
price for a horse, harness and buggy.
Plaintiff was a minor at time of
purchase, a married man with wife
and child, worked as a day laborer
for support of himself and family,
and did not use the purchased property except for pleasure riding.
Plaintiff, at time of bringing action,
had sold the harness and buggy, and
the horse had been condemned by the
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty
to Animals as unfit for use. Notwithstanding plaintiff offered no return of the property he seeks recov-
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ery of the money paid by him as
stated.
Arthur Keeney and
Harry E. Denny,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
This is an infant's voidable contract, is not for necessaries, and
plaintiff may recover without returning the consideration. Nor does the
marriage of the infant change his
status as infant. Antonio vs. Miller,
34 Pac. 40; Goodman vs. Alexander,
55 L. R. A. 781; Guthrie vs. Murphy,
28 Am. Dec. 681; Price vs. Sanders,
60 Ind. 30; Beichler vs. Guenther, 96
N. W. 895; The Rose Case, 27 Am.
Ryan vs. Smith, 165 Mass.
Rep. -;
303-43 N. E. 109; House vs. Alexander, 105 Ind. 109; Wheat6n vs. East,
26 Am. Dec. 251; Forda vs. Van
Horn 30 Am. Dec. 77; N. & C. Ry.
Co., 78 Am. Dec. 506; Green vs.
Green, 69 N. Y. 553; Miles vs. Lingerman, 24 Ind. 385; The Lemon
Case (Ohio) 15 N. E. 476; Wallace
vs. Leroy, 50 S. E. 243-110 Am. St.
Rep. 777; Larkin vs. Foster, 64 Atl.
1048.
John F. Heffernan and
T. Spencer McCabe,
Attorneys for Defendant.
Plaintiff, by marriage, assumes the
contract obligations of an adult, with
respect to his family, and for his purchase in this case made for the benefit of his family he is liable. At any
rate he cannot disaffirm the contract
without return of the consideration.
Glenn vs. Hollopeter, Ca. 21 L. R.
A. 847; Cochrane vs. Cochrane, 196
N. Y. 86; Commonwealth vs. Graham, 16 L. R. A. 578; Aldrich vs.
Bennett, 56 Am. Rep. 529; Houch vs.
LaJunta Hdwr. Co., Col. 114 Pac.
645; Coburn vs. Raymond 100 Am.

St. Rep. 1000; Taft vs. Pike, 14 Vt.
306; Words & Phrases, vol. 8, pg.
680; Englebert vs. Pritchett, 26 L.
R. A. 177; Johnson vs. N. W. Mut. L.
Co., 26 L. R. A. 187.
CAUSE NO. 3.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
John D. Carson as Admr. of the Estate of Ray Stephens, deceased
VS.
Charles D. Simpson and Edward
Williams
Ray Stephens, in his lifetime, made
an agreement with Charles D. Simpson to sell him a horse on approval.
The understanding was that Simpson should take the horse and try
him, and if the horse suited him,
give Stephens his note with approved
security; but if the horse did not
suit him he was to return the horse
to Stephens.
A few days after this agreement
Stephens was killed. Simpson did
not return the horse, but later traded
it to the other defendant, Edward
Williams.
Plaintiff brings action to recover
the horse or its value.

Patrick E. Granfield and
Joseph J. Doran,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
To support plaintiff's right of action the following cases are cited:
Wolf Co. vs. Monarch Refrigerator
Co., 96 N. E. 1063; Fox vs. Wilkenson, Wis. 113 N. W. 669-14 L. R. A.
(NS.) 1107; 2 Benj. on Sales 4th
ed. 1051; Cream Cirt Glass Co. vs.
Friedlander, 84 Wis. 53-21 L. R. A.
(NS.) 135; Dodsworth vs. Hercules
Iron Wks., 66 Fed. 483; Brown vs.
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Foster, N. Y. 15 N. E. 608; Vanwinkle vs. Crowell, 146 U. S. 42.
William A. Miner and
Clarence Smith,
Attorneys for Defendant.
The trading of the horse by Simpson to Williams constituted an approval of the horse for purchase and
a valid acceptance of the offer to sell,
so as to pass title 'to the defendants.
Plaintiff cannot therefore recover
property that belongs to defendants.
Mactier's Adm. vs. Frith, 21 Am.
Dec. 262; Bower vs. Detroit Ry. Co.,
20 N. W. 559; Sweeney vs. Vaaghor,
29 S.W. 903; Yale vs. Coddington, 21
Wend. 173; Bradbury vs. Marburry,
46 Am. Dec. 264; Girard vs. Taggert,
9 Am. Dec. 327; Grant vs. Groshaon,
3 Am. Dec. 725; Brackenridge vs.
State, 11 S. W. 630; Stephenson vs.
Repp, 25 N. E. 803; Foster vs. Adams, 15 Atl. 169.

CAUSE NO. 4.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
James Mansfield
VS.
Daniel O'Conner
James Mansfield, in company with
three others, went upon the farm -of
Daniel O'Conner, to hunt. This was
without the permission and knowlO'Conner had
edge of O'Conner.
signs tacked upon his fences on
which was printed: "No hunting allowed on these premises.
O'Conne rowned and kept a big
shepherd dog. This dog had the
known habit of running to the fence
and barking viciously at passers-by.
On one occasion the dog had gone
through the open gate and bitten a

man, of which fact, O'Conner had
been informed.
Mansfield, on the occasion in question, had no knowledge whatever of
the fact that O'Conner had a dog,
until the dog viciously attacked him
and seriously wounded him, biting
him three times in the legs. O'Conner was not at home at the time of
the hunting trip of Mansfield and
knew nothing whatever about the affair until he arrived home later. The
dog attacked and bit Mansfield while
he wos on the premises of O'Conner.
Is O'Conner liable to Mansfield or
has he a defense to the action which
Mansfield brings for the injuries sustained on account of the dog bites?
Edwin J. McCarthy and
Mark R. Healey,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Defendant is liable for the injuries
inflicted by his dog which he knew
was of a vicious character, even
though the plaintiff may have been
a trespasser. Partlow vs. Hagerty,
35 Ind. 178; Williams Case, 74 Ind.
25; Clanin vs. Fagan, 124 Ind. 304;
Sherfey vs. Bartley, 67 Am. Dec.
597; Woolfe vs. Chalker, 31 Conn.
121-81 Am. Dec. 175; Rider vs.
White, 65 N. Y. 54-22 Am. Rep. 600;
Grasson vs. Hofius, 80 Pac. 1002;
Marsh vs. Jones, 52 Am. Dec. 67;
Glidden vs. Moore, 45 Am. Rep. 98.
Joseph H. Farley and
William E. Krippene,
Attorneys for Defendant.
Plaintiff was a trespasser on defendant's premises and defendant
owed him no duty except not to do
him wilfull injury. Defendant's dog
was kept on his own premises and
was not of such character as would
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make defendant liable to trespassers.
Indiana Refining Co. vs. Nobley, 24
L. R. A. (NS.) 497; Victor Coal Co.
vs. Muir, 26 L. R. A. 435; St. Louis
R. R. Co. vs. Holsman, 57 S. W. 770;
Benson vs Baltimore Traction Co.,
20 L. R. A. &14; Muench vs. Heinnan, 96 N. W. 800; Ritz vs. City, etc.,
31 S. W. 993; Galveston Oil Co. vs.
Morton, 7 S. W. 756; Indpls. vs. Emmelman, 108 Ind. 530; Ind. B. & W.
Ry. vs. Barnhart, 115 Ind. 399.
CAUSE NO. 5
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Sadie Thompson
VS.
Carl Meyne

dition to what she had when she
came to their home.
After three years, Sadie left the
Meynes. At no time did Sadie ever
ask for money and at no time did the
Meynes ever give her any money. At
no time did Sadie ask for wages or
pay for her services and at no time
did the Meynes ever ask Sadie to
pay them anything for her board and
lodging. And when Sadie left the
Meyne home, there was nothing said
by either as to any charge or account
between them.
Three months after leaving the
Meyne home Sadie brings action for
wages at the rate of two dollars per
week for the entire time of her stay
at the Meynes.

Paul V. Paden and
Carl Meyne and his wife were midFrank M. Hughes,
dle-aged people having no children
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
of their own. They lived on a farm
There is an implied contract to pay
in a comfortable country home. Sadie Thompson was a girl of fourteen plaintiff what her services are reasvs. Hodge,
years, of the general size and health onably worth. Hodge
L. R.
764-11
Pac.
of girls of that age. Sadie went into Admr. (Wash.) 91
Hef888;
page
on
the home of the Meynes and lived A. 873, and Note
E.
N.
there three years. During the first ron vs. Brown, 155 Ill. 322-40
Iowa
two years, Sadie went to the country 583; Caven vs. Musgrave, 73
384.
the
of
school during school terms
year. At all other times, including
Paul J. Schwertley and
morning and evenings she did the
Raymond J. Kearns,
chores and work about a country
Attorneys for Defendant.
home where there are horses, cows,
One living in the household as a
chickens, etc., on the farm. Sadie
of the family is not entitled
did all kinds of house work, milking, member
services rendered, nor is
for
pay
to
churning, feeding, cleaning, etc. She
any liability for board and
worked about the kitchen and the there
Grohan vs. Stanton, 58 N.
lodging.
rooms of the home. In fact, Sadie
vs. Taylor, 64 Pac.
Walker
1023;
E.
did everything she was directed to
Deeds, 44 Iowa
vs.
Windland
193;
do.
45 Iowa 308;
Johnson,
vs.
;Smith
98
The Meynes boarded and lodged
S. E. 78;
31
Jackson,
vs.
Jackson
Sadie and gave her some clothing,
Andrews
278;
Wis.
29
Finch,
vs.
Hall
which, however, she claims was one
vs.
Butler
556;
Vt.
17
Foster,
vs.
pair of stockings, a calico dress and
Mcvs.
Oxford
451;
St.
Pa.
50
Store,
a pair of shoes, but what the Meynes
3 Ind. 156.
claimed was all Sadie needed in ad- Farland,
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TRIAL BRIEFS IN CASE OF
John Reilly vs. Gerald Davenport
Cause No. 1
Junior Moot Court
By
Aaron H. Huguenard for Plaintiff
Franklyn E. Miller for Defendant
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff parked his limousine in Michigan Street, South Bend, Indiana, at right angles with the curbing in violation of the city ordinance.
The defendant, while carelessly and negligently driving his automobile,
crashed into the limousine and damaged it to the extent of $1,000, for
which plaintiff brings action.
BRIEF FOR PLAINTIF
Defendant is liable to plaintiff for
a tort. Certainly the plaintiff had the
right not to be damaged in his property; and certainly there was imposed on the defendant a duty not to
cause the destruction of his limousine, as he did.
Defendant is liable for the specific
tort of negligence. Negligence, according to many reliable authorities
such as Cooley and Chapin, consists
in failing to fulfill a legal duty to exercise a proper degree of care, whereby damage results to one to whom
such legal duty is owing. Defendant
"carelessly and negligently" ran into
the plaintiff's limousine.
Has the plaintiff a right to damages? One of the facts given above
is that the plaintiff's machine was
parked in violation of a city ordinance; that the angle which it formed
with the curb was greater than that
which the city ordinance permits.
Now, it is a well-known rule of law
that no one will be permitted to profit by his own wrong. It would be
unreasonable to think that one would
be allowed to commit an illegal act

and then as a result of it, enter into
litigation and receive a handsome
verdict, and we of the plaintiff's side
realize this very well. We are ready
to admit that if a person's unlawful
act contributes proximately to his
own injury, he may not recover damages of another for a negligent participation in that injury, but the
mere fact that he is engaged in an
unlawful act is not enough to bar his
action unless the transgression of the
law has contributed directly to the
accident.
Consequently, if the illegal conduct of the injured party proximately causes his injury-remember,
proximately causes-he will be without redress. It must be always kept
in mind that the illegal conduct must
be a proximate or concurring cause,
for if the plaintiff's conduct merely
renders the injury possible it will be
merely treated as a condition. Concerning the defense of contributory
negligence, in the case of Rider vs.
Syracuse Rapid Tr. Co., 171 N. .Y.
139-63 N. E. 836-58 L. R. A. 125, it
is sail: "Plaintiff's negligence must
be proximate cause in the same sense
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in which the defendant's negligence
must have been a proximate cause in
order to give a right of action." In
other words, if the plaintiff's act was
merely a remote cause or condition,
there can be no bar to his recovery.
Perhaps, it would be well for me to
go into detail more concerning the
words, "cause" and "condition ;" or,
as sometimes differentiated "proximate cause" and "remote cause."
We find in the law dictionaries,
condition defined as "a mechanical
antecedent without casual power,"
cause, defined as "the responsible
ble, voluntary agent, changing the
ordinary course of nature." A proximate cause must be a "causa causans; not merely a causa sine qua
von." All courts are agreed that
there is an essential difference between a cause and a condition but
the difficulty arises in trying to distinguish between them.
In the Railroad Company vs. Price,
a Georgia case, 32 S. E. 77, the defendant negligently carried the
plaintiff past her destination and the
conductor advised her to spend the
night at a certain hotel in the town
at which she alighted, agreeing to
pay her expenses and to carry her
back in the morning. It was held
that his negligence in carrying her
past her station is not to be regarded
as a cause of injuries received by her
from the explosion of a lamp at the
hotel.
Again, where a town negligently
permits a tree to remain standing in
a street notwithsanding its dangerous condition, which tree is blown
down and strikes a motorman who
is running his car at an illegal rate
of speed, the illegal speed is a condition merely. Berry vs. Borough,
Penn., 43 Atl. .240.

I cite these cases to show what the
courts have held as conditions or remote causes. In our case, everything
hinges upon these two words, condition and cause.
Was the fact that our client's car
was illegally parked, a concurring
cause of the collision or was it a mere
condition? That is the issue. Upon
the answer to this question depends
the decision. If the car so parked
was a concurring cause of the accident, then the plaintiff is without redress.
If the car so parked was
merely a condition, then the judgment must go to the plaintiff.
No reasonable person would hold
that the mere parking of the car was
a concurring cause of the accident.
For the, doctrine of contributory
negligence to apply, the plaintiff's
negligence must be concurrent of the
same kind, immediate, and not something of a prior time. In this case,
the plaintiff had already violated the
ordinance,his act was of a past time,
and it was not of the same nature as
the defendant's
In Scheurer vs. Banner Rubber
Co., 227 Mo. 347-126 S. W. 1037-28
L. R. A. (NS) 1207, the court says:
"If the plaintiff's negligence affords
only an opportunity or occasion for
the injury, or a mere condition of it,
it is no bar to his action." And all
we contend is that our case be decided in accordance with this principle.
True it is that the plaintiff's machine would not have been damaged,
had it not been located where it was,
but it does not follow that it would
have gone unharmed, had it been
parked in accordance with the city
ordinance, for the conduct of the defendant was of such a grossly careless and negligent nature that it more
than likely would have been ruined
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even had it been a little closer to the
curb.
The plaintiff's car is of a limousine
type. Suppose it had been an ambulance backed at a right angle to the
curb, waiting to receiving one on
stretchers. The defendant's car, in
its riotous meanderings, would have
crashed into the ambulance far more
easily than it would into the plaintiff's car, for the latter car was not
parked at so blunt an angle. Could
the defendant have pleaded contributory negligence or illegal conduct of
the plaintiff in the ambulance case?
Or, suppose it had been a truck backed at a right angle unloading articles
of great weight. Both the ambulance
and the truck would have protruded
farther into the street than the limousine without constituting an illegal act or an act of contributory negligence. Plaintiff's action in parking
his limousine cannot reasonably be
considered a concurring cause while
in the hypothetical ambulance and
truck cases the positions of those machines do not constitute even so much
as a remote cause. If the plaintiff's
act in this case is not a concurring
cause, then it must be a condition,
and as such, decision must go to the
plaintiff. Let us cite a few cases in
point.
In Steele vs. Burkhardt, 104 Mass.
59- 6 Am. Rep. 191, this occurred:
Plaintiff had his wagon parked at an
angle which was prohibited by city
ordinance. The defendant carelessly
drove upon the plaintiff's horse and
injured him. The case is exactly analogous to the present case and the
judgment was for the plaintiff. The
court said: "The plaintiff did show
negligence in respect to keeping the
ordinance, but did not necessarily
show negligence that contributed to
the injury." And we are willing to

admit the same here, namely: that
the plaintiff did show negligence as
to the ordinance but that he did not
directly contribute to the injury.
In Spofford vs. Harlow, 3 Mass.,
176, it was held that though the
plaintiff's sleigh was on the wrong
side of the street in violation of law,
the defendant was liable, if his servant ran into the plaintiff carelessly
and recklessly, the plaintiffs negligence not contributing to the injury.
In the Railroad Company vs. Buck,
116 Ind. 566-19 N. E. 453, a laborer
while working on Sunday was injured through defendant's negligence.
The defendant plead the fact that
plaintiff was violating the Sunday
working law. The court said: "Our
conclusion is that a person injured
through the negligent omission of
another, even though he violated the
observance of the Sunday law, will
not be denied a recovery."
This case while not so similar in
facts as the two Massachusetts cases
cited is exactly in point in that violation of a statute by the plaintiff will
not preclude a recovery where defendant has been negligent, if the plaintiff has not been a proximate cause
of the injury.
In Tackett vs. Taylor, 123 Iowa
149-98 N. W. 730, an Iowa case, it
was held that conducting a machine
across a defective bridge in an unlawful manner does not bar recovery unless it contributes directly to the in-.
jury.
And so we might go on citing numerous cases, all bringing out this
point: Plaintiff can maintain an action for damages caused by defendant's negligence, even though plaintiff does violate an ordinance, provided that he does not contribute directly to the injury. But that these will
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suffice to bring out the general principle.
That the plaintiff violated an ordinance is admitted, but we vigorously
contend that violation is only an occasion for the injury, or a condition
of it, and therefore, decision should
be in plaintiff's favor.

The rule of law as applied to an action of tort for injuries inflicted upon
the plaintiff while he is engaged in
an unlawful act is that if his illegal
act did not contribute to the injury,
but was independent of it, he is not
precluded thereby from recovering.
And this, we submit, is the true rule
of the law. Schultz vs. Paul, Ind. Law
BRIEF FOR DEFENDANT
Report 10; Spofford vs. Harlow, 3
Allen 176; Kearns vs. Sowden, 104
There is no distinction between the Mass. 63; Steele vs. Burkhardt, 104
violation of a state statute and the Mass. 59-6 Am. Rep. 191. However,
infraction of a municipal ordinance; if the jury find that the conduct of
both are, by the law, placed upon the the plaintiff either proximately or
same plane: Hayes vs. Michigan Cen- contributorily affected the injury of
tral R. R. Co., 111 U. S.; Yanke vs. which he now complains, he will not
Lange et al., Wis., 170 N. W. 722; 21 be entitled to recover: Lloyd vs. Pugh
Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law 483; 33 and Ludke vs. Burck, supra. In other words, whether or not the act of
Minnesota 323.
The judge should peremptorily in- the plaintiff either proximately or
struct the jury that the act of the contributorily affected the collision
plaintiff in parking his car in violation is a question of fart for the jury:
of the city ordinance constituted neg- Milw. and St. P. R. R. Company vs.
ligence per se: Lloyd vs. Pugh, Wis. Timothy Kellogg, Iowa. 94 U. S. 469149 N. W. 150; Ludke vs Burke, Wis. 24 Law. Ed. 256; Chapin on Torts
152, N. W. 190; Smith vs. M. B. & T. 103; White vs. Long, 128 Mass. 598E., 91 Wisconsin 360-64 N. W. 1041- 35 Am. Rep. 402.
30 L. R. A. 504-51 Am. St. Rep. 912.
In order for the plaintiff to recovthe
effect
er he must show that he exercised
The law is uniform to
in
viodue care in the prevention of the inthat a person, being engaged
his
jury of which he now complains. Salation of law, cannot recover if
own illegal act was an essential ele- vet vs. Manchester and Lawrence R.
ment of his case as disclosed upon R. Co. 77 Am. Dec. 422; Heland vs.
all of the evidence: Norris vs. Litch- City of Lowell, Mass. 81 Am. Dec.
field, 35 New Hampshire, 271-69 Am. 670; Damon vs. Inhab. of Scituate,
Dec. 546; Meyers vs. Meinrath, 101 119 Mass. 66-20 Am. Rep. 315; Smith
Mass. 366-3 Am. Rep. 368; Cranston vs. Boston & Maine R. R. Co., 21 Am.
vs Goss, 107 Mass. 309-9 Am. Rep. Rep. 538; Norris vs. Litchfield, 35 N.
45; 119 Mass. 66-Rep. 315; Smith vs. H. 271-69 Am. Dec. 546; Newcomb
Boston and Maine R. R. Co., 120 ye. Boston Pro. Ass'n. 146 Mass. 596Mass. 490-21 Am. Rep. 530; New- 4 Am. St. Rep. 354.
cbmb vs. Boston Pro. Ass'n., 146
In the leading case of Savett vs. R.
Mass. 596-4 Amn. St. Rep. 354; R. Co., supra. the court held, that a
Cratty vs. City of Bangor, 57 Me. passenger in a railway car is wanting
423-2 Amn. Rep. 56; Johnson vs. in ordinary care, if, knowing that the
Town of Irasburgh, 47 Vt. 28-19 Am. train is moving, he goes out on the
platform of a car, and steps thereRep. 111.
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from upon the platform of the station while the car is still in motion,
and he cannot recover from the railroad company for an injury resulting
therefrom.
If a person needlessly and recklessly exposes himself to open and obvious danger by his failure to exercise due care, and thereby suffers an
injury as the result thereof, he will
be guilty of such negligence as will
prevent a recovery for such injury;
Day vs. Cleveland, etc., R. R. Co.,
137 Ind. 206-36 N. E. -854; Brazil
Block Coal Co. vs. Hoodler 129 Ind.,
327-27 N. E. 741. In the first of
these cases the court held, that where
a railroad employee, a car repairer,
in helping to move a car upon the
track, took a position at the draw
bar, under a running board, one end
of which rested on the car that was
being moved and the other end on another car, one of which, when the car
sad been moved far enough fell on the
employee, injuring him, the employee
being ignorant of the fact that such
board had not been removed, but
which he could easily have seen if he
had looked, the danger being as obvious to the employee as to the employer-the employee cannot recover; and in such case, it is the duty of
the trial court to instruct the jury
to find for the defendant, the employer.
A fortiori, if a person exposes his
property to open and obvious danger
through his failure to exercise due
care, as did the plaintiff do in this
case, in that he permitted his limousine to be parked in violation of a
municipal ordinance, to protrude out
and obstruct the public highway for

a period of time exceeding three
hours, a highway whereon a heavy
traffic was in the course of operation,
it follows that he cannot now complain of the injury inflicted upon his
property, which injury-in part at
least- was attributable to his failure
to exercise due care. The law, I take
it, requires that men shall use the
senses with which nature has endowed them, and when, without excuse,
they fail to do so, they alone must
suffer the consequences, and they are
not excused when they fail to discover the danger if they made no attempt
to employ the faculties with which
nature has blessed them.
Especially is this true when the
law imposes an obligation or duty on
an individual and charges him with
the duty to exercise due care. Brazil
Block Coal Co. vs. Hoodler, supra;
Stewart, Admr. vs. Pa. Ry. Co. 130
Ind. 242-29 N.E. 916; Pa. Ry. Co. vs.
Meyers 136 Ind. 242-36 N. E. 32.
Therefore when the plaintiff in
this case failed to exercise even slight
care in the protection of his property, when he neglected to call into operation his reasoning power to work
upon the material supplied him by
experience, namely, that it was dangerous and an unnecessary risk for
a man to allow his property to project into a congested highway, when
he absolutely ignored and broke the
provisions of the municipal ordinance, he did then and there assume
all responsibility for any damages
which might be inflicted upon his
property through the negligence of
some other person.
Franklin Elliot Miller,
Attorney for the Defendant.
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ALUMNI
(Contributing Section)

THE LAW AND LAWYERS
By William Hloynes, A. M., LL.D.,
Dean Emeritus
It is commonly said that the legal
profession is over crowded. This is
a pessimistic generalization.. It is
lacking in valid basis. It may be admitted, however, that there is no
special dearth of lawyers anywhere,
whether in our cities or average
towns. There is probably no county
seat in any of our states that has not
its due quota of them. Statistics indicate that there is one for every 660
persons throughout the country.
Early in the last century they were
proportionately less than half as
numerous. In other countries they
compare numerically with the thousands or more as they do here with
the hundreds. Their number has increased responsively to the growth
and expansion of business, although
doubling relatively to the augmenting aggregate of population.
The late war caused a diminution
in the trend of young men to the profession and materially abated the alleged prospect of overcrowding it.
Moreover, of late years the normal
volume of legal business has measurably decreased.
This remark is
confined to such business as could
customarily be counted upon or expected by the ordinary lawyer-the
lawyer in general practice. Many
disputed accounts of merchants and
traders are now referred to and settled by arbitration. Where this is
not done they are usually intrusted
to collecting agencies, which have
their own lawyers to represent them
in litigation. Trust companies and
corporations generally in the more

populous centers retain lawyers for
their special service and pay them
annual salaries. To them for advice or action in court are committed matters involving possible or
probable litigation.
Needless to
state, they are almost invariably disposed of apart from the regular profession or lawyers engaged independently in practice. Their fixed policy,
however, seems to be in favor of settlement or compromise and the avoidance of litigation. In this respect
their course is commendable and in
harmony with the precepts of legal
ethics.
But there is another class of lawyers, or pseudo-lawyers, who are apThey
propriately styled shysters.
are intrusive and crafty, unscrupulousandbrazen. Theydo not hesitate
to seekandopenlysolicit business. Indeed, sometimes they go further and
actually harass prospective litigants
in the hope of being retained by
them. If they learn of an accident
involving personal injury they lose
no time in communicating with the
victim or his family, offering their
services and saying that they will pay
all the costs of litagation and take
the case on shares, 40 or 50 per cent.
to themselves and the balance to the
victim or his family. If they hear of
a family quarrel, with prospect of a
suit for legal separation or divorce,
they let it be known promptly by
card or personal interview that their
services are at command. If an assault or murder be committed, and
the perpetrator or his family can
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furnish funds for defense, their business cards or personal appeals to be
retained in the case quickly follow.
Not a few of them make the police
court their favorite morning rendezvous, in order that they may be at
hand to tender their legal aid to persons arrested during the preceding
night for drunkenness, disorderly
coduct, and the like. If they are told
of some one having a dormant claim
susceptible of being twisted into
ground work for a suit they seek his
acquaintance, express belief in his
having a case and urge him to intrust
them with it. Of course, all such
practices are violative of legal ethics,
discreditable to the shysters and derogatory to the profession. Reputable lawyers are now striving to eliminate these buzzards and prevent
heieafter their admission to the bar.
Trough such practices a spirit of
commercialism has crept into the
.profession in some of the larger cities, and its traditional dignity, chivalry and honor are thus becoming
obscured and jeopardized. Hence
the solicitude of the American Bar
Association and reputable lawyers
generally to block the danger and
turn to rescue work.
Trust companies and even labor
unions cut materially into the legitimate and regular business of the
general profession. Such companies
now claim and control in notable degree real estate transfers, the settlement of the estates of deceased persons, the guardianship of orphans or
other wards, the collection of money
and management of funds according
to directions of testators and trustees, the transfer of securities and
the investment of funds under trust
terms, and, in short, things innumerable that formerly passed in the
main through the hands of lawyers

engaged in general practice. And as
for labor unions the practice seems
to be to turn over to certain lawyers
in apparent affiliation with them such
matters of litigation as concern the
membership as a whole or the members individually.
The pessimist may admit that
such facts have weight in disproving
his assumption that the profession is
overcrowded. "But look," says he,
"behold the vast number of students
in the law schools of the country who
are preparing to enter it! It will certainly be overcrowded when they get
their diplomas and pass the examination for admission to the bar!"
Another mistake, Mr. Pessimist!
Less than 50 per cent of those who
study law follow it as a profession.
The knowledge they thus acquire is
utilized in other pursuits. It is of
exceptional value in all lines of business, not to mention other professions, and as the foundation of a
broad and practical education. It is
safe to say that no branch of study is
more serviceable and illuminating in
preparing the mind for the acquisition of sound, useful and available
knowledge. It enters almost unconsciously but controllingly into the
mind, and imparts prudence to
thought and guidance to action. It
teaches the mind to investigate and
examine the problems and difficulties referred to it for practical consideration and to pursue the path of
calm reflection and discerning wisdom in reaching their solution. It
guides to sound discretion in business affairs, showing with seeming
intuition when a contract has been
validly made, when a wrong has been
done or may be avoided in tort, or
when a lawless act has been perpetrated or threatened in the realm of
crime. It opens and presents to the
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observing mind the whole vast domain of nature's organic laws and op
erations and man's countless activities.
Inscrutable in many respects
though it be to our hampered vision,
yet it is the most interesting and inviting vista to which the human eye
may turn in the whole plan of mundane life. Knowledge of the fact
seem to be instinctive, and it is reasonably obvious that the law offers the
surest and most practicable means of
journeying safely and creditably
through the mazes of human life. Its
helpful guidance is a trusty mentor
that leads not astray. Is it surprising, therefore, that so many apply
themselves to its study, even without
purpose to engage in its practice,
viewing it as a matchless factor in
sound educational equipment?
Though they finish, let it be repeated, the prescribed course of study in law schools and receive diplomas evidencing the fact, yet from 50
to 60 per cent of them turn to other
professional walks and the occupations innumerable they decide to select. Their knowledge of the law bespeaks for them high standing and
exceptional success in the fields of
their ultimate choice. Many even of
those admitted to the bar, as in the
case of President Wilson, see surer
ground of success and advancement
in other lines of activity, and act accordingly, yielding to the impulse of
following the latest alluring call.
The man destined, however, to become a power in the law decides unalterably to stick to it. The hardships he must encounter and the difculties he must overcome may seem
unbearable, but he does not become
faint-hearted nor is his courage
abated. His clothes may become

thin and threadbare, but he complains not of cold and seems to ignore
their shabbiness. His larder may
be empty and his food the coarsest
and cheapest procurable, but the
pinch of hnunger does not affect him
and the simplest food is a feast before the great and dominating passion he cherishes for his beloved
Themis-the Law. He knows that
it is within the common experience
to wait many months and tedious
years for success, and he is willing,
goodnaturedly to get into line and
wait his turn. Health may fail, but
the spirit does not, in a young man
of this type. He reads, works, observes and studies to the full rneasure of his strength.
He takes to
heart and cultivates the qualities
likely to make him popular, respected and trustworthy. He knows that
character makes the man and is the
stamp which unquestionably passes
current everywhere, so he seeks to
base his own on the pedestal of
honesty, reliability, truthfulness and
efficiency. He aspires to become
learned, efficient, successful and conspicuous in the law, and to this end
thus visualizes in mental picture as
to traits and character his inspiring
exemplar of honorable achievement
and acclaimed greatness in the profession.
My exemplar in law is fundamentally and invariably a gentleman, although in this respect all the learned
professions are or should be in kinship. He is liberally aducated and
fully aware of the obligations he sustains to his profession, fellow-citizens and society. He is alert and
prompt in the discharge of the duties he assumes, punctual and reliable
in the performance of his professional functions, deliberate in judgment
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and conscientious in conforming to
the trust and confidence reposed in
him. By nature, inclination and civic study he is fond of his country and
ready to respond to its call in forum,
field or council whenever emergencies arise and dangers seem imminent. As a representative of the
law he aims to be unbiased in his estimate of men. In dealing with them
he is modest, kindly, genial and altruistic, and thus easily obtains access to their confidence and abiding
claim on their good will. If in his
way right be assailed by wrong his
sense of justice impels him instinctively by word and act to side with
the right and repel the wrong with
requisite force and valor. He mingles unassumingly with his fellowcitizens and is ready always to bear
his share of the common burden, as
well as to proclaim and advocate or
defend all reasonable measure looking to the public welfare. In doing
so he serves with alacrity in any .capacity that the occasion may demand.
The mean passion of envy and the
odious vice of duplicity find no room
in his frank and manly nature. In
the discharge of his varied duties,
civic and social, he aims to be just
and honorable. He makes no promise that he cannot or does not intend
to fulfill. Honesty is his pole-star,
and he abhors the thought of cheating, deceiving or misleading any
man. I'e believes that religion is the
soul of the law, complementary to it
at every angle, and he endeavors to
square his thoughts and acts conformably to its teachings. He views the
law as a noble science, not as a mere
art, and conscientiously dedicates to
He
it his life and best services.
would make and keep it impartial, efcient and trustworthy-thepalladium
of right, the embodiment of justice

and the preserver of peace-in short,
a blessing indispensable to society
and mankind. He desires his profession to be as learned in fact as it reputedly is in name. He knows that
his acts, whether good or bad, will
be imputed to it in some measure,
and finds in this consciousness an
added stimulus to think, speak and
act the part of a gentleman, whether
in the forum on the hustings or in
the public mart. His professional
work is characterized by forethought
and careful preparation, so that he
may not betray ignorance and suffer
humiliation before the court and
jury, embarrass the judge and consume time not his own in correcting
or amending with judicial leave mistakes in his pleadings, trespassing
on the time of other lawyers and the
public by delaying the regular procedure of the court through his inexcusable negligence and blundering,
forfeit the confidence of his dliet and
probably lose his case through negligence and incompetency.
The aspiring and reflecting student might have added many oother
traits of character to his ideal picture of a great and honored lawyer
before his eager vision. At any rate,
so far as they go, they promise efficiency, popularity, success and distinction in the profession. The student's visualized' exemplar beckons
inspiringly to all learners of the law.
A LETTER
Hoynes College of Law
Univerversity of Notre Dame
Dear Colonel Hoynes:The November issue of the Notre
Dame Law Reporter will contain for
the first time the Alumni Section. In
this section it is contemplated that
in each issue there may appear some
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article contributed by an alumnus of
the Law School.
There is a unanimity of opinion
that the first contribution to this
section would most appropriately
and satisfactorily come from the
Founder of the Law School-that is
yourself; that a few lines from your
pen would afford the greatest interest and pleasure possible to the alumni. You are the one man whom every alumnus knows and reveres, and
a word from you would supply the
November issue of the Reporter with
its most acceptable feature.
As one of the many alumni who,
have gone out from your school I
think I may fairly speak for them
all in assuring you that a contribution from your pen would be very
joyfully and gratefully received.
Any article you may choose to submit, whether personal, reminiscent,
descriptive, advisory or purely legal
in character, will be gladly printed.
May we not receive something from
you by the 15th of November?
With assurances of the Law Faculty's considerations of respect and
particularly of my own sincere personal regard, permit me to subscribe
myself,
Your grateful alumnus,
FRANCIS J. VURPILLAT,

For the Law Reporter Staff.
To Col. William Hoynes,
Dean-Emeritus, Hoynes College of
Law, Notre Dame University,
Notre Dame, Indiana.
CLASS OF '20 AT THE BAR EXAMINATIONS
Their Letters and Reports
Following are the letters and reports of several members of the
Class of '20, coming immediately- aft-

er successful examinations

for ad-

mission to the bars of the several
states. They bubble over with genuine enthusiasm, pride, happiness and
gratitude.
ILLINOIS
Chicago, Ill., July 27, 1920
Hon. Frances J. Vurpillat, Dean,
College of Law,
Notre Dame, Ind.
My Dear Judge:
It is my pleasure and also my good
fortune to be able to tell you that I
have just successfully passed the Illinois Bar Examination. The examinations were held on July 13 and 14
ad I just received my notice yesterday, so you can appreciate how much
relieved I am after two weeks of very
anxious waiting.
Allow me to express to you and to
the faculty of law the gratitude that
I feel for the instruction and preparation that I received while a student
in the College of Law at Notre Dame.
I assure you that I attribute my success entirely to the very able schooling and guidance given me by you
and the other members of the law
faculty.
During the days of the examination I had an opportunity to talk to
men from almost all the big law
schools of the country (450 took the
examination), and I can honestly
say that the impressions I received
conviced me that Notre Dame's
course in law is the most complete
and thorough of them all. The court
work especially is unequalled anywhere and I hope that next year this
part of the work will be carried on
even more -extensively according to
the plans that I know you have formulated for it.
Hoping that you have been enjoying the summer and that the press of
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law business will not be too heavy to
prevent me fiom running down in
the fall to visit The Hoynes College.
(Little fear of the latter)
I am
Respectfully
Clifford O'Sullivan.
October 18th 1920.
Hon. Francis J. Vurpillat, Dean,
College of Law,
Notre Dame, Indiana.
Dear Judge:
I am enclosing the questions asked
at the recent bar examination held at
Springfield, Ill., on October the 8th
and 9th last. I trust that the same
will give you an idea of the severity
of the test. The Chicago Bar Association recently informed me to the
effect that fifty-two candidates out of
the clhss of two-hundred-ten passed.
I am pleased to state that Notre
Dame went over for a touchdown, for
both Frank Hurley and myself tackled the questions with the old school
spirit.
While at the hotel in Springfield
many of the men inquired after the
one session, why the smile? I believe it followed the session in which
pleadings seemed to be the favorite.
I told them I had a good course in it,
so why shouldn't I give vent to my
feelings. Bets were made at the hotel that I passed.
This firm was extremely pleased
with the outcome, and I was assigned
a case today in which a chorus girl
is my client. I expect to attend the
home-coming game on the sixth of
November and I should like to have
a chat with you. Regards to all the
boys.
Sincerely,
Leo J. Hassenauer.

NEW YORK
455 Fulton Street
Waverly, N. Y. Aug. 14,1920.
Hon. Francis J. Vurpillat, Dean,
Hoynes' College of Law,
University of Notre Dame.
Notre Dame,- Indiana
Dear Judge Vurpillat:
Today I was notified by the State
Board of Law Examiners that I successfully passed the bar examinations
held at Albany, N. Y., on June 29th
and 30th. I will be sworn in before
the Court of Appeals at the opening
of the fall term next month.
Judge, let me take this way to
thank you, the other professors in
the law school, and Notre Dame for
the training which enabled me to
pass the bar examination. I can never speak too highly of the classes at
Notre Dame, and especially of the importance of the work in moot court.
With every good wish, I am
Respectfully yours,
Francis J. Clohessy.
NEW MEXICO
East Las Vegas, N. M.
September 7, 1920.
Judge F. J. Vurpillat,
Notre Dame, Ind.
My Dear Judge:
I take great pleasure in advising
you that I have sucessfully passed
the bar examination in this state.
There were nine aspirants to the legal profession here and five out of
that number failed. The Chairman
of the Board of Examiners informed
me that I have a splendid paper, and
that another young man and I were
tied for first place.
The examination dealt almost en
tirely with substantive law. The sub
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jects of contracts, equity, wills, negotiable instruments, real property, evidence, and common-law pleading,
were the most important, especially
the last, they gave us a thorough exam. on that subject, and I assure you
I did not pass up one question.
I wish to thank you and all the
members of the faculty for the assistance and co-operation and learningi
through which I was enabled to pass
with flying colors. * * * :'

With very best wishes for the continued success and growth of the
best law school in the country, I am
Very respectfully yours,
L. V. Truder.
INDIANA
Like the Iowa boys, the Indiana
members of the Class of '20, after
successfully passing their final examination for degree, set out to attain admission to the bars of their
respective courts.
Arthur B. Hunter, Edwin A. Fredrickson and Michael Edward Doran,
were examined by the Committee of
the St. Joseph County Bar Association at South Bend, Indiana, and
were found worthy of admission to
their Bar Association. That these
men from Indiana are capable of passing any bar examination in the
States is conceded by the Class of '20
and all who know them.
Francis J. Murphy has successfully passed the examination of the Tippecanoe County Bar Association and
been admitted to the practice at Lafayette, Indiana.
Harry Richwine has been admitted
to the bar at Anderson, Ind.
A letter of another capable Indiana
boy follows:

September 1, 1920.
Dear Judge:
* * * * I was admitted on the 23rd
July and opened up on the 26th. The
examination committee was one of
the most severe in the county, and
the examination was the hardest given in many years, according to Judge
John Morris, one of the examiners.
Contrary to the general custom, my
exam. was a written one, and most
peculiar.
There were fourteen questions,
each of which was to be fully briefed, not merely answered, but citing
authority and writing the matter up
in the general form of a brief. I
had, however, the privilege of a library, the only condition being that
I do the work myself. After they
had been examined, I was told that
only three men had passed that exam. since it has be~n existing form.
These were Judge Vesey, one of the
biggest corporation corporation lawyers in town, a young man in Vesey's
office, and myself. Besides these victorious three twety-five others have
had the same thing to do, but sorry
to say these men were not successful.
If you desire I will send you a copy
of these questions some time. They
occupied three sheets of legal cap,
single spaced and some of them were
ringers, too. * * * *

Ever sincerely yours,
Lawrence S. Stephan.
IOWA
Immediately after their successful
final examinations for graduation
from the Law School in June, and
before receiving their degrees, Humphrey L. Leslie, Richard B. Swift,
Clement Mulholland and Ralph Bergman went to Des Moines, Iowa,
where they took the bar examination.
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From their glowing reports upon
their return to the University, it
seemed these men were as much
"looked up to" and sought out by the
fifty applicants at that examination
as are N. D.'s football team on the
gridiron. They scored very high,
one scoring third, with the others
very close to him. Reports indicate
that the men made themselves and
the University conspicuous. A joint
telegram from Des Moines announced their success and gave expression
to the quartette's praise of Notre
Dame's College of Law and its course.
A recent letter of Clement Mulholland of Fort Dodge, follows:

campaigner for your law course at
Notre Dame. I just heard the other
day that I got third place in the Bar
exams. in June, and I think that all
the credit should go to the school and
the law faculty. The man who got
first place was a middle aged man
who had been a court reporter or
clerk of court (I forget which) for
about 25 years. The one who got
second place was a girl, the daughter
of the assistant attorney general of
Iowa. I have received no official notice of this but a friend of mine here
in Fort Dodge said that it came out
in the Des Moines Register & Leader
a few days after the examination.
Very sincerely,

Fort Dodge, Iowa, August 29.

Mulholland.

Dean Francis J. Vuryillat,
University of Notre.

NEW JERSEY

Dear Judge:
I received your letter stating that
you were going to inaugurate an
LL. M. course this coming year and I
regret very much to say that it will
be impossible for me to be with you,
although I would like nothing better
than to go back to the old school and
continue the work under you; but I
have decided to take up banking as
my life work and I figure that the
sooner I get started and get the actual experience in this new field the
better it will be for me. * * * *
Dick Leslie and "Del" Smith are
the only two members of the class of
1920 that I have kept track of since
leaving Notre Dame. I believe that
they both intend to practice in Des
Moines and no doubt "Del" told you
about his plans while he was at summer school.
I hope that you are successful in
enrolling a large number of fellows
in this new course * * * * You can
rest assured that I will be an active

November 8, 1920.
Mr. Francis Vurpillat,
Dean of the College of Law,
University of Notre Dame,
Notre Dame, Indiana.
Dear Sir:
I am enclosing herewith check for
$2.00 for one year subscription to
the Law School Reporter.
I was
glad to hear of the publication and I
believe it will do a lot for the Law
School and the University at large.
Everything is running
along
smoothly with me; and thanks to the
examination upon which I wasted so
much profanity in 1919, I was able to
pass my Bar Examination at the first
attempt, being one of the 31 per cent.
who were successful on the examination I took. However, I will expect
to see you in June, and I will tell you
all about it then.
Yours very truly,
Andrew L. McDonough.
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POINTS, PERSONAL, PROFESSIONAL, POLITICAL

About the Alumni
Harry H. Kelly, LL.B. '17, attended the home-coming. Harry is
engaged in the practice of the law as
a member of the firm of Kelly & Kelly
of Ottawa, Ill., the other members of
the firm being his father and his
brother, Emmett Kelly, LL.B. '19.
Harry lost his leg in the world war,
from which he was mustered out as
first lieutenant. In the recent election Lieutenant Kelly was elected
States Attorney of his district.
The race for prosecuting attorney
in St. Joseph's County, Indiana, in
the recent election was a free-for-all
for the Alumni of the Law School.
In the primary George A. Schock,
LL. B. '17, and Samuel Feiwell, LL.B.
'18, were opposing candidates for the
Democratic nomination, while Floyd
B. JellisQn, LL.B. '15, received the
Republican nomination. Schock was
the successful candidate in the primary, but in the Republican landslide that followed, Jellison was
elected to the office.
Emmett Mulholland, LL.B. '16,
and Clement B. Mulholland, LL.B.
'20, are doing a Land Office business
with offices at 300 Snell Bldg., Fort
Dodge, Iowa. Emmett has engaged
as his chief assistant in the office, at
home and everywhere, his daughter,
born September 21st.
The Des
Moines Register and Leader reported
Clement B. Mulholland to have attained third place in the recent bar
examination.
Good for two good
boys-men we mean.
Vincent Giblon, LL. B. '18, and Joseph T. Riley, LL.B., '18, shook
hands across the dean's desk in the
Hoynes College of Law on the occasion of their visit at home-coming
time. These are two first magnitude

stars of the constellation of '18. Giblin in the office of the president of the
American Bar Association in Jacksoville, Fla., while Riley has been
practising law in Grand Rapids and
Muskegon,
Michigan.
Recently,
however, Riley has been hobnobing
with state and national politicians in
Michigan as a member of the state
republican organization.
Louis Finske, LL.B., '19, has opened law offices in the National Bank
Building, Michigan City, Indiana,
for the general practice of the law in
his home town. Louis is an earnest,
capable and industrious fellow and
will merit success.
Robert C. Carr, Ph.B. and Law,
'17, is practising law as a member of
the firm of Johnson & Carr, Central
Life Bldg., Ottawa, Illinois. Notre
Dame has a large contingent of successful lawyers in and about Ottawa.
His brother, Joseph D. Carr, entered
as a law student this year.
Walter L. Clements, LL.B., '18,
finds time apart from his law practice to launch an agricultural journal for St. Joseph County, Indiana.
Walter's office is in South Bend.
Henry B. Snyder, LL.B., '15 and
Chas. Patrick Maloney, LL.B., '16 recently formed a partnership for the
practice of law in Gary, Indiana.
Their offices are located at 738 Broadway. A good firm and a good field.
William C. Henry, LL.B., '16, a notable orator and law student of his
time, visited here during home-coming week. Will is with the firm of
Busby, Weber, Miller & Donovan,
1639 National Bank Bldg., Chicago.
Hugh T. Lavery, LL. B., '19, has
begun the practice of law in Bridgeport, Connecticut.
Hugh was for
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two years a reliable member of the
varsity pitching staff as well as a
successful student of the law.
Thomas J. Hoban, LL.B., '18, one
of the bright lights of his class, has
opened offices foathe practice of law
at 16 Chicago Street, Elgin, Illinois.
Louis H. Hellert, LL.B., '18, has
built up a lucrative law practice for
himself at old Vincennes, Indiana.
His office is in the American Bank
Building.
Arthur J. Hughes, LL.B., '17, was
recently married in Washington, Illinois, to Miss Frances Mahle. Mr.
Hughes will be remembered as an exceptional student, not only of the
law, but of arts as well, from which
department he also took a degree.
When we last heard of Mr. Hughes
he was a successful member of one
of the prominent law firms of Chicago. We sincerely wish both Mr.
Hughes and his bride health, wealth
and, happiness.
A law firm which is fast forging
to the front in prominence and recognized ability in Northern Indiaa is
the firm of Vaughan & Vaughan of
Charles E.
Indiana.
Lafayette,
Vincent D.
and
'14,
Vaughan, LL.B.,
Vaughan, LL.B., '17, comprise the
Quite recently Charles E.
firm.
Vaughan and Miss Mary A. Reifers
were married in Lafayette. We wish
the law firm continued prominence
and the married firm long life and
happiness.
We have recently received communications from two law men
whose last names in rhyme or assonance gave us no little trouble during
our first semester as a member of
the law faculty. They are George F.
Frantz, LL.B., '17 and Albert J.
Kranz, LL.B. '17. Frantz is a member of the law firm of Clementson &
Frantz, Lancaster, Wisconsin. Kranz

has law offices of his own in the
Nicholas Bldg., Toledo, Ohio.
Andrew L. McDonough, LL.B., '18,
who was a long distance runner in
the law course, as well as on the
track, writes an interesting letter
about his bar examination experience
in New Jersey following his profane
experience in the final examination
for degree here. Andrew has successfully launched into the practice
of law, with offices in the Babcock
Bldg., Plainfield, N. J.
William E. Bradbury, LL.B., '16,
was a welcome visitor recently. He
is a member of the law firm of Bradbury & Bradburry of Robinson, Illi
nois, where William's father has long
been a widely known and honored
member of the Illinois bar. William
himself has come into prominence by
his brilliant and successful conduct
of some important cases. He is a
brother of J. Stanley Bradburry who
is in the second year of the law
course in our Law School.
Associated with their father in the
practice of the law are Joseph B. McGlynn, LL.B., '12 and Daniel McGlynn, LL.B., '18. The elder McGlynn is an old and honored member of the Illinois Bar, and together
with the capable and aggressive
young members of the firm, still directs a large and growing practice.
George E. Herbert, LL.B., '18, of
Hoopeston, Illinois, is attaining
prominence and success in the practice of the law.
Our reporter observed in attendance
on the Notre Dame-Purdue game at
time of the home-coming, the following alumni of the Law School: Francis O'Shaughnessy, '00; Fred L.
Steers, '11, both of Chicago, and
Michael Fansler, '14, of Logansport,
Indiana.
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NEWS OF THE CLASS OF '20
Richard B. Swift writes that he
has begun the "starvation period"
and for that reason could not avail
himself of the proposed LL.M. course.
Dick's office is in the Laurel Building, Muscatine, Iowa, is the finest in
the city and is already housing a
complete working library. Richard
admits that he has a petition in the
district court, a divorce case set for
trial and the executor of a large estate as a client. Verily, only a
Swift, Richard B., could do so well.
Success will be his.
We have just seen the following
professional card which was clipped
from a local paper: "Francis J. Murphy, Attorney-at-Law, Fourth and
Columbia Streets, Lafayette, Indiana." These are glad tidings from
Murphy of an early and successful
start. We trust he may not be dismayed upon receiving this issue of
the Reporter to learn that his first
appeal to the supreme court has been
lost. Despite his excellent trial and
appellate brief in the case of the St.
Joseph Loan & Trust Company vs.
The First National Bank, the Supreme Court of Notre Dame affirmed the decision. Good, Francis J.
Lawrence S. Stephan has opened a
law office for himself 4t 617 Calhoun
St., Fort Wayne, Indiana, and is already in the active practice. As official stenographer of the Notre
Dame Circuit Court, a commencement orator, a business manager of
the 1920 Dome, general utility man,
as well as an excellent student, Stephan's success is assured.
We are informed that Humphrey
L. Leslie and Delbert D. Smith have
decided upon the formation of a partnership for the law practice in DesMoines, Iowa. We confidently feel

that they will succeed in this venture as they did at Notre Dame.
Arthur B. Hunter, one of the leaders of the class, is rendering excellent service in the law offices of McInernys, Yeagley & McVicker of
South Bend, Indiana. We know this
from a recent talk had with the senior member of the firm in which he
spoke in terms of the highest praise
of Mr. Hunter's work, ability and
prospects.
Michael Edward Doran, one of the
star men of the class, is maintaining
his law office in the Farmers Trust
Bldg., South Bend, Indiana, and we
know he has made an excellent start
and is doing well.
Edwin A. Fredrickson, one of the
exceptional men of the Law School,
has begun the practice of law in the
office of G. A. Farabaugh of South
Bend, Indiana. His appearance in a
recent trial in the Superior Court
was spoken of in very complimentary terms. Mr. Fredrickson is also
engaged as an instructor in the Law
School, having assigned to him the
subjects of agency, partnership, negotiable paper and insurance, for a
period of one hour each day for the
year.
Harry Richwine and Maurice F.
Smith have returned for the LL.M.
course.
Harry P. Nester, Walter R. Miller
and Edwin C. Donnelly have qualified
for taking the Ohio bar examination
in December.
Joseph O'Hara is workig in the
law offices of James Hamilton Lewis,
in the Rookery Building, Chicago,
and is preparing to take the Illinois
bar examination next month. Joe
writes: "It gives me great pleasure
to hear of the successes of that famous class of '20. I think each of
them shares with me the knowledge
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of what we owe to our instructors
during our three years of study, and
I am sure they, not all of course,
will write their names on the scroll
which lies under the title Auccess."
Joe will take the December Illinois
bar examinations.
Francis T. Walsh is in the offices of
the Board of Review of Livingston
County, Pontiac, Illinois. He says
he is studying daily in the law office
and confidently expects to succeed at
December bar examination in Ili-

William J. Granfield, Henry B. Snyder, George F. Frantz, Frank X.
Rydzewski, Vaughan & Vaughan, W.
J. Hines, Wilmer O'Brien, M. J. McGarry, Clement Mulholland, Andrew
L. McDonnough, William C. Henry,
Louis H. Hellert, John G. Mott of Los
Angeles, Albert J. Kranz, Joseph B.
Murphy.
PROPAGANDA

With the sanction of the Rev.James
A. Burns, C. S. C., President of the
The letters of Leo J. Hassenauer, University and with the hearty coLawrence S. Stephan, Clifford O'Sul- operation of the Rev. William A.
livan, Thomas V. Truder, Clement Maloney, C. S. C., the College of Law
Mulholland and Francis J. Clohessy, has launched a campaign among its
which appear in this issue, speak for graduates to secure additional serthemselves of the brilliant successes viceable volumes for the law library.
of the Class of '20.
What the Law School desires particuLeo J. Ward is reported to be in larly just now are the state reports
the law office of Hon. Joseph Scott, of the various states up to the point
laetare medalist, Los Angeles, Cali- or number where the West Publishing Company's reporter system takes
fornia.
We have no word from Alfonso them up. Our school is so rapidly
Anaya, Emmett Rohyans and George growing into a national school, that
Murphy.
is, with enrollment made up of students from so many states of the UnLAW REPORTER SUBSCRIPion, that we feel the necessity of havTIONS
ing the reports, digests, codes of
practice, pleading form books, statReceipt of two dollars in payment
utes, etc., of their respective states.
for the 1920-1921 subscription to the
We believe there are hundreds of
Law Reporter from each of the fol- volumes of this character on the
lowing named alumni, is here ac- shelves of the alumni themselves or
knowledged, to-wit: John R. O'Con- that might be readily picked up,nell, Thomas J. Walsh, James E. books in good second-hand condition,
Deery, William P. Breen, Donald M. that have been perhaps replaced with
Hamilton, Ralph S. Feig, Paul J. later editions, such as statutes and
Donovan, Curry & Curry, Harry G. codes, which, when supplemented
Hogan, F. Henry Wurzer, Hugh J. with the subsequent acts of the legisDaley, Fred L. Steers, Joseph B. Mc- latures, would serve to good advanGlynn, Timothy Ansberry, James P. tage in the law school, and indeed,
Fogarty, W. A. Guilfoyle, James L. not be needed by the alumnus. We beHope, E. P. Carville, Robert C. Carr, lieve that many such valuable volThomas J. Hoban, Fred L. Maheffey, umes might be procured for the Law
Richard B. Swift, Patrick M. Maloy, School "for a mere song," if only we
nois.
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might get to singing. We have already received the Pennsylvania,
Ohio and the Iowa reports.

CONCERNING THE LAW SCHOOL

"The Law School of Notre Dame
University
opened auspiciously this
The dear alumni can make no misyear
with
an
enrollment of two huntake in sending to the good, old Law
dred
and
twenty
students coming
School, their new codes, form books,
from
thirty
states
of
the Union, Porand even the first numbers of their
ta
Rico,
Chili
and
the
Philippines.
state reports to the point indicated,
Numerous
and
important
changes
for they can readily supply themwere
made
in
the
last
year,
beginselves with other new volumes. Or,
ning
a
new
era
for
the
school.
The
if they prefer, they might find for us
Hoynes
College
of
Law,
a
new
and
the good second-hand books as sugdistinctive
law
building
for
the
exgested. The city or state alumni association of the country can accom- clusive use of the school, was occuplish much for the Law School in this pied. This is a modern structure
providing four large rooms, library,
manner through concerted action.
court room and three class rooms, all
Any of the books here enumerated equipped with American, steel pedeswill be gladly received or any infor- tal, tablet arm, chairs.
mation appreciated which may lead
Col. William Hoynes, for many
us to the state reports to be procured. years dean of the Law School, has
The donor's name and the donation been proclaimed dean-emeritus and
will be entered of record in the spe- lecturer on international law. Judge
cial acquisition book of the law li- Francis J. Vurpillat, acting dean for
brary kept for the purpose.
three years, has been made dean and
continues as professor of constitutional law, procedural law and the
courts. Judge Gallitzen A. FarraGRATEFUL ACKNOWLEDGEbaugh
and Professor John P. TierMENT
nan remain with the school. Two
members have been added to the faThe University and, in particular, culty, Asst. Professor, James P. Costhe College of Law, hereby make tello of Pennsylvania, graduate of
grateful acknowledgement to the fol- Dickinson Law School, and a praclowing Notre Dame lawyers for their ticing lawyer of twenty years, to
respective gifts to the Law library, whom has been assigned common-law
actions and forms, contracts and corto-wit:
James P. Fogarty, LL.B., 1900, of porations; Edwin A. Fredrickson,
Philadelphia, Pa., 109 vols. Pennsyl- a practicing lawyer of South Bend,
Indiana, a student in the Universivania State Reports.
ty of Michigan and a graduate of
John C. Shea, LL.M., '17, of Day- Notre Dame Law School, who has
ton, Ohio, 119 vols. Ohio and Ohio been made instructor in agency, partState Reports.
nership and negotiable paper.
Richard B. Swift, LL.B., '20, of
The four year course has been
Muscatine, Iowa, as principal donor, modified to prescribe a pre-law year
with others whose names will be re- of college work which is equivalent
ported later, 110 vols. Iowa Reports. of a year and a half of the regular
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arts courses. To the three year
course of law one is eligible who has
attained sophomore standing in any
recognized college. Classes in the
Prniciples of Liability and Study of
Cases have been added to the freshmen schedule.
The complete and thorough system
of courts, trial and appellate, inaugurated by Judge Vurpillat, has proven a very effective and popular addition to the school. Another valua-

ble new feature of the school is the
Notre Dame Law Reporter, a quarterly fublication launched with the
April and June Numbers. The Reporter is devoted to the interests of
the law students and alumni and is
primarily their work. It contains
the decisions of the Supreme Court of
Notre Dame, circuit court court records and various other departments.
It contains a law list of Notre Dame
Lawyers -?f the country.

NOTRE DAME LAW REPORTER

DIRECTORY
Of the Notre Dame Law Alumni
In Forwarding Business to a Distant Point Remember Your
Fellow Alumni Appearing in This List.
ARIZONA
TusconJames V. Robins,
107 Melrose St.
ARKANSAS
Little RockAristo Brizzolara,
217 E. Sixth St.
CALIFORNIA
Los AngelesTerence Cocgrove,
1131 Title Insurance Bldg.
John G. Mott, of
Mott & Cross,
Citizens National Bank Bldg.
Michael T. McGarry,
530 Higgins Bldg.
Leo B. Ward,
4421 Willowbrook Ave.
San FranciscoAlphonsus Heer,
1601 Sacramento St.
COLORADO
TellurideJames Hanlon
CONNECTICUT
BridgeportDonato Lepore,
645 E. Washington Ave.
Raymond W. Murray,
784 Noble Ave.
HartfordJames Curry and Thos. Curry, of
Curry & Curry,
D'Esops Bldg., 647 Main St.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
WashingtonTimothy Ansberry,
208-12 Southern Bldg.
GEORGIA
AtlantaFay Wood,
225 E. Fourth St.
ILLINOIS
AuroraRobert Milroy,
113 Fox St.
BataviaJoseph Feldott
Belvidere-Stephen F. McGonigle,
1011 Whitney St.

BuddArthur B. Hughes
CampusFrancis T. Walsh
ChicagoFrancis O'Shaughenessy,
10 S. LaSalle St.
Hugh O'Neill,
Conway Bldg.
Charles W. Bachman,
836 W. Fifty-fourth St.
John Jos. Cook,
3171 Hudson Ave.
James V. Cunningham,
1610 Conway Bldg.
Hugh J. Daly,
614 Woodland Park
Leo J. Hassenauer,
1916 Harris Trust Bldg.
William C. Henry,
7451 Buell Ave.
John S. Hummer,
710-69 W. Washington St.
Albert M. Kelly,
2200 Fullerton Ave.
Daniel L. Madden,
Conway Building
Clement C. Mitchell,
69 W. Washington St.
William J. McGrath,
648 N. Carpenter St.
Thos. J. McManus,
5719 Michigan Ave.
John F. O'Connell,
155 N. Clark St.
Joseph P. O'Hara,
1060 The Rookery
Clifford O'Sullivan,
2500 E. Eeventy-fourth St.
Stephen F. Reardon,
405 Peoples Life Bldg.
Francis X. Rydzewski,
8300 Burley Ave.
Delbert D. Smith,
3966 Lake Park Ave.
Fred L. Steers,
1350 First National Bank Bldg.
Max St. George,
108 S. LaSalle St.
DecaturWilliam P. Downey,
110 N. Water St.
DixonJohn Sherwood Dixon,
East OttowaHarry F. Kelly, of
Kelly & Kelly,
Eastwood
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East St. Louis-Joseph B. McGlynn and Daniel McGlynn,
of McGlynn& McGlynn,
120 N. Main St.
ElginThos. J. Hoban,
16 Chicago St.
Frank A. McCarthy;
18-14 Elgin National Bank Bldg.
Lawrence McNerney,
Home Bank Bldg.
William Perce,
Opera House Bldg.
Elmer Tobin,
18 Chicago St.
GalesburgHon. Charles Craig
HoopestonGeorge E. Harbert,
827 E. Penn St.
HowardPaul J. Donovan
KewaneeThomas J. Welch,
Savings Bank Bldg.
LodaDaniel P. Keegan
MendotaJohn W. Dubbs,
Washington St.
MolinePeter Meersman,
205 Reliance Bldg.
Matthew McEniry,
408 Peoples Bank Bldg.
Mt. CarmelMartin E. Walter,
119 W. Seventh St.
OttowaRobert C. Carr, of
Johnson & Carr,
Central Life Bldg.
John E. Cassidy,
322 E. Superior St.
James J. Conway,
406-7 Moloney Bldg.
Daniel C. Curtis,
519 Guthrie St.
Thomas O'Meara,
Route 27
Thomas O'Meara,
406-7 vtoloney Bldg.
PeoriaGeorge Sprenger,
Jefferson Bldg.
PoloRobert Bracken
RobinsonWilliam E. Bradbury,
RochelleThomas F. Healy
First National Bank Bldg.

Rock IslandFrancis A. Andrews,
631 Fifth St.
SpringfieldThomas Masters
Albert C. Schliff,
918 N. Sixth St.
StreatorElmer J. Mohan,
Route No. 3
WoodstockPaul Donovan,
Hoy 'Block
INDIANA
AndersonEdward C. McMahon,
2004 Fletcher St.
Philip O'Neill,
511-13-15 Union Bldg.
CrawfordsvilleJustin J. Molony,
706 Binford St.
ElkhartJames S. Dodge,
229-31 Monger Bldg.
Wilmer O'Brien,
325-6 Monger Bldg.
Robert Proctor,
201-5 Monger Bldg.
Fort WayneWilliam P. Breen, of
Breen & Morris,
Peoples Trust Bldg.
Joseph Haley,
202 Shoaff Bldg.
Cornelius B. Hayes,
New Hayes Hotel
Thomas A. Hayes,
501 Bass Block
Frank M. Hogan, of
Colerick & Hogan,
Cor. Court and Berry Sts.
Emmett A. Rohyans,
2725 S. Calhoun St.
Lawrence Stephan,
1431 Hugh St.
Frankfort-Earl F. Gruber,
Dinwidie Bldg.
GaryHenry B. Snyder and Patrick Maloney,
of Snyder & Maloney,
738 Broadway
IndianapolisJames E. Deery,
316-324 Law Bldg.
Paul J. Smith,
2024 Central Ave.
KokomoGeorge F. Windoffer,
324 W. Jefferson St.
LafayetteFrancis J. Murphy,
430 S. Third St.
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Chas. E. and Vincent Vaughan, of
Vaughan & Vaughan,
710-711 Lafayette Bldg.
John W. Eggeman,
800 N. Fourth St.
LaGrangeGeorge D. McDonald,
114 Sixth Ave.
LintonHugh E. Carroll
MarionFred B. Mahaffey,
622 S. Brownson St.
Michigan CityLorenzo Glascott,
223 W. Tenth St.
James Kenefick,
Care T. M. J. and J. P. Kenefick
Louis Finski
MishawakaRalph Feig,
Mishawaka Trust Bldg.
John Schindler,
215 S. Main St.
MontgomeryBernard Heffernan,
Route 4
McCordsvilleHarry Kelly
William H. Kelly
South BendLeo J. Cook,
410 Union Trust Bldg.
G. A. Farabaugh and
E. A. Fredrickson,
504 J. M. S. Bldg.
Samuel Feiwell,
404 Citizens Bank Bldg.
Charles Hagerty,
J. M. S. Bldg.
Vernon R. Helman,
R. F. D. 5, Box 18
Patrick Houlihan,
203 Title Bldg.
Arthur B. Hunter,
710 Portage Ave.
Floyd Pellison,
334-36 Farmers Trust Bldg.
Joseph J. Kovacs,
109 N. College St.
Arthur May,
811 J. M. S. Bldg.
Ernest Morris,
Farmers Trust Bldg.
Thomas D. Mott,
522 Farmers Trust Bldg.
William McInerny,
104 Summers Bldg.
William B. O'Neill,
406 Citizens Bank Bldg.
John E. Peak,
224-26 Farmers Trust Bldg.
George W. Sands,
211-12 Convervative Life Bldg.

Armand Schellinger,
415-16 Union Trust Bldg.
George Schock
Samuel Schwartz,
706 J. M. S. Bldg.
Edwin H. Sommerer,
125 N. Francis St.
VincennesLouis H. Hellert,
American Bank Bldg.
IOWA
CarrollJoseph J. Meyers,
201 Masonic Temple
Des MoinesWilliam J. Hynes,
504 Observatory Bldg.
DubuquePatrick J. Nelson,
200-6 Security Bldg.
Fort DodgeMichael F. Healy,
605-10 Snell Bldg.
Emmet P. Mulholland, and
Clement B. Mulholland,
300 Snell Bldg.
Ida GroveMatthew M. White
Iowa CityJohn J. Ney
LenoxEugene F. McEniry
lason CityJohn D. Wilson
MuscatineRichard B. Swift,
504 Laurel Bldg.
NewtonRalph Bergman
PrestonHarry Godes
WaverlyHumphrey L. Leslie,
204 S. State St.
KANSAS
Kansas CityRussell C. Hardy,
812 N. Fifth St.
Thomas V. Holland,
1623 Central Ave.
Theodore J. Lyons,
716 Pyle St.
KENTUCKY
LebanonSamuel J. Spaulding,
Box 585
Samuel T. Spaulding
OwensboroAlbert Oberst,
Masonic Bldg.
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LOUISIANA
New Orleans-Patrick E. Burke,
307 Camp
Thomas V. Craven,
305 Wells Fargo Bldg.
Boston-

MoIASSACHUSETTS

William P. Higgins,
730 Tremont Bldg.
SpringfieldWilliam J. Granfield
Co' rt Square, Theatre Bldg.
MICHIGAN
DetroitHarry Cullen,
1226-30 Dime Bank Bldg.
Daniel Foley,
1626 Penobscot
Thomas A. McLaughlin,
76 Belmont Ave.
Louis C. Wurzer and F. Henry Wurzer,
Wurzer & Wurzer,
910 Majestic Bldg.
FlintVincent D. Ryan,
910 Flint P. Smith Bldg.
Grand Rapids-Joseph Riley,
236 Valley Ave., N. W.
JacksonJames G. Henley,
117 W. Pearl
LansingMaurice D. Kirby,
310 Bauch Bldg.
MINNESOTA
CrookstonEdmund E. Sylvester,
124 State St.
Joseph H. Sylvester,
124 State St.
DuluthThomas McKeon,
817 Torrey Bldg.
Minneapolis-Edward F. Barrett,
1774 Gerard Ave., S.
St. CloudGeorge L. Murphy,
340 Seventh Ave., S.
MISSOURI
Kansas CityLeonard M. Carroll,
3117 Flora Ave.
Drexel L. Duffy,
201 Linwood Blvd.
Llewellyn D. James,
323 W. Armour Blvd.
John R. Meyers,
310 Ridge Bldg.

St. Louis-John L. Corley,
Fullerton Bldg.
MONTANA
ButteTimothy Downey,
21 Center St.
Frank C. Walker,
825 W. Quartz St.
John Ward,
28 E. Quartz St.
GalenAlbert Galen,
Galen Block
MaltaWilliam McGarry
NEBRASKA
WahooFrank Kirchman,
Box 337
NEVADA
ElkoEdmund Carville,
Farrington Bldg.
Reno-Michael Diskin
NEW JERSEY
PlainfieldN
Andrew L. McDonough,
Bqbcock Bldg.
RockawayDaniel P. Murphy,
Wriebands Corporation
NEW MEXICO
Las VegasThomas V. Truder,
East Las Vegas
NEW YORK
AlbanyT. Paul MeGannon,
Care Office Attorney-General
Buffalo-Max G. Kazus,
459 Amherst St.
GenevaFrancis T. McGrain,
9 State St.
Daniel J. Quinlan,
52 Hallenbeck Ave.
New York CitySimeon Flanagan,
Care John J. Sullivan,
203 Broadway
Peter McElligott,
428 W. Twenty-fourth St.
PalmyraHarold P. Burke
WaverlyFrancis J. Clohessy,
455 Fulton St.
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NORTH DAKOTA
MinotGeorge McGee
Park RiverJacob V. Birder
RugbyThomas Toner,
Main St.
OHIO
AkronClarence May,
427 Second National Bank Bldg.
Walter McCourt,
365 S. Main St.
CincinnatiErnest DuBrue,
835 Beecher Ave.
Cleveland1852 Ansell Road
Stanley B. Cofall,
Harry Miller,
Grasselli Chemical Co.
Walter Miller,
318 Leader News Bldg.
James O'Hara,
303 Park Bldg.
Hugh O'Neill,
1934 Euclid Ave.
ColumbusDonald Hamilton,
801-8 Huntington Bank Bldg.
DaytonThomas Ford,
127 Maple St.
Joseph B. Murphy,
618 Dayton Savings & Trust Bldg.
John C. Shea,
Schwind Bldg.
HamiltonMichael O'Burns,
338 S. Second St.
LancasterMichael A. Dougherty,
343 E. Walnut
Harry P. Nester,
156 E. Chestnut St.
LimaFrancis W. Durbin,
607 Law Bldg.
MaumeePeter M. Ragan
NapoleonEdwin C. Donnelly,
827 Haley Ave.
SanduskyEdmund Savord,
Room 3, Sloan Block
ToledoRobert Dederich,
2619 Scottwood
Albert J. Kranz,
116 Nicholas Bldg.

Edwin J. Lynch,
642 Nicholas Bldg.
James T. McMahon,
2916 Collingwooa Ave.
John B. McMahon,
940 Spitzer Bldg.
Arthur W. Ryan,
366 W. Central Ave.
OKLAHOAIA
TulsaHarold R. Delaney,
1412 S. Boulder St.
Leo Holland
Patrick M. Malloy,
1115 Denver St., P. 0. Box 1957
OREGON
AstoriaJames L. Hope,
312-15 Spexarth Bldg.
IndependenceFrancis W. Kirkland
PortlandRoscoe Hurst,
1406 Yeon Bldg.
Frank Lonergan,
816 Electric Bldg.
Roger Sinnott,
Chamber of Commerce
WoodburnStephen Scollard
PENNSYLVANIA
HomesteadJohn J. Brislan,
400 McClure St.
JeanetteJohn W. Ely,
601 Germania Bank Bldg.
JohnstownJohn C. Larkin,
322 Wood Ave.
PhiladelphiaJames P. Fogarty,
1607-08 Finance Bldg.
Edward Gallagher,
301 E. Lehigh Ave.
George Hanhauser,
401 Market St.
PittsburghDaniel C. Dillon,
811 Frick Bldg.
RydalEdward Britt
SOUTH DAKOTA
ChamberlainNicholas Furlong
EdgemontWilliam A. Guilfoyle
HowardTheodore Feyder
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TENNESSEE
MemphisCharles McCauley,
383 N. Second St.
TEXAS
BeaumontHarry P. Barry,
Stark Bldg.
SintonBryan Odem,
Sinton State Bank
James F. Odem
WASHINGTON
CentraliaWilliam Cameron,
304 W. Plum St.
WISCONSIN
FennimoreRalph J. Lathrop
George F. Frantz, of
Clementson & Frantz,
Gravenbrock Bldg..
Green BayJohn Diener,
Room 1, Parmentier Bldg.
MilwaukeeFrank Burke,
904 Pabst Bldg.
Joseph E. Dorais,
Belvidere Apt., 58
Thomas C. Kelly,
66 Eighth St.
Chgauncey Yockey,
514 Wells Bldg.
Edward Yockey,
Merchants & Farmers Bank Bldg.

NeelsvilleGeorge A. Frantz
PlymouthGilbert P. H~and,
105 Milwaukee St.
RacineGrover F. Miller,
1116 College Ave.
SpartaJohin P. Doyle,
508 S.Water St.
SuperiorSherman May,
2016 Hammond St.
CUBA
CeinfuegosAndrew Castille,
Box 505
M1EXICO
Mexico CityAlfonso Anaya,
Qa, Apartado 52
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
Beinaton UnionBernardo Lopez
ManilaJose Manuel Gonzales
Turlac, TarlacJose Urquico
Misamia .ProvinceEmilio Aranus
SorsogenDoroteo Amador

